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,, 
Timely 
SUMMARY: Petr challenges the CA3's holding that Resp was 
denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Arndt right to trial by a fair and 
impartial jury. 
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: 
;g~/ 
Resp was convicted i~f .~ 
first degree murder and rape in a Clearfield County, Pennsylva-
nia, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Su-
~ prerne Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction and ordered a 
~· ( 1\~ ~~ ~" \,~ ~~ ~~ '!'~"" ~~ ~\.~~ \Ml~ ~ 
~~jR~ 
1-
new trial on the ground that Resp ha~ not received his Miranda 
warnings. (Miranda had been decided between Reps's arrest and --· 
trial.) Upon return to Clearfield for retrial in 1970, Resp 
'-
moved for a change of venue. He charged that the dissemination 
of prejudicial information outside of evidence was so widespread 
that an impartial jury could not be drawn. The TC found that 
after the initiation of Resp's appeal some four years earlier, 
the media had merely publicized action in the courts "without 
editorial comment of any kind." It consequently denied the mo-
tion. After the first jury panel was exhausted during voir dire, 
Resp again moved for a change of venue. Again the motion was 
denied. Th~oted on this occasion that it had been four 
---....-
years since Resp's first trial and there had been little public 
""- / 
discussion of the alleged murder between that trial and announce-
ment of the new trial date: that there were no "unfair inferences 
or prejudicial effects as to or against" Resp in the newspaper 
accounts of the crime: that since commencement of the second set 
11 •\ 
of proceedings, there had been fewer than four spectators in the 
courtroom at any one time, a reflection of the general lack of ---
I 
interest in the retrial: and that "almost all, if not all, jurors 
seated had no prior or present fixed opinions" on Resp's guilt. 
Trial was held. Resp was ~ain convicted of first degree 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. (The prosecution had 
dropped the rape charge.) Resp filed a post-conviction motion 
for a new trial, arguing inter alia that the TC erred in denying 
his motions for a change in venue. The motion was denied. The 
TC reiterated that there had been "practically no publicity" dur-
I 
( 
ing the four years between trial and retrial, and "practically no 
It explained that 
time only because~ 
public interest" shown in the second trial. 
voir dire had taken an / inordinate amount of 
~~~~------~~------------------------~ 
Resp "raised so many questions and the court exercised its dis-~ 
cretion to assure that there could be no complaint about the fi-
nal jury empanelled." Appeal was tak~n. This time, the State 
Supreme Court affirmed. 
tLSeven years lat~r, Resp filed a habeas petition, alleging _________.. 
---~ -
that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amdts right against self-incrimination (a claim 
not in issue here), and his Sixth ana Fourteenth Amdts right to a 
fair trial by a~impartial jury. The federal magistrate conclud-
ed that the writ should issue because Resp had been denied a fair 
and impartial jury due to pretrial publicity. Notwithstanding 
the magistrate's recommendation, the~ (Ziegler) denied the pe-
tition. The DC emphasized at the outset that the factual find-
ings of the TC were ~esumptivel~- corr~ under 
§2254(d). He then went on to say that Resp had 
28 u.s.c. 
failed to carry 
his burden of establishing that actual prejudice had rendered a 
fair trial in Clearfield impossible. There was "substantial 
knowledge" of the case within the community to be sure, said the 
DC, but most importantly, ~ch juror had stated that he or she 
-:;;;;?-
was able to set aside any preconceived notion about the case and 




CA3 reversed the DC's holding that Re~d received 
a fair and imp~ial jury. Citing to Murphy v. Florida, 
794 (1975) and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 u.s. 712 (1961), the 
' 
court imposed the burden on Resp--as had the DC--to show from the 
"totality of the circumstances" that there was such extensive 
publicity as to "cause actual prejudice to a degree rendering a 
fair trial impossible." In particular reliance upon Irvin v. 
Dowd, to determine whether Resp carried that burden, the CA3 con-
s idered ( 1) the extent and the content of the publicity; ( 2) the 
opinions expressed by the prospective jurors and the difficulty 
encountered in finding veniremen able to decide Resp's case im-
partially; and (3) the testimony of the jurors actually selected 
to determine whether any pattern of community prejudice extended 
to them. 
It found that the publicity, while accurate and factual, 
revealed~rejudicial information that was never heard from the 
witness stand in Resp's second trial. The publicity disclosed, 
..___. -··----, 
for instance, that the jury in the first trial had convicted Resp 
not only of murder but of rape; that Resp had executed written 
confessions to the murder; and finally, that Resp had pled tempo-
rary insanity at the first trial. Through the repeated community 
exposure provided by the newspaper coverage of both the appeal 
and retrial, said the CA, these facts were kept in the forefront 
of the public mind. The court next determined that the actual 
jurors' assurances of impartiality must be given little weight 
because of the depth of the veniremen's sentiments; over three-
quarters of the veniremen admitted to a belief that Resp was 
guilty. Last, the CA found that the prejudice evident in the 
voir dire and in the community was reflected in the testimony of 
and two alternates selected. 
' 
I 
All but one of the jurors were familiar with the case, ana sever-
al specifically recalled Resp's earlier conviction and confes-
formed an opinion as to And even when asked wheth-
er they could set their opinions aside, some of the jurors pro-
vided ambiguous answers. The CA concluded that in light of the 
publicity, the difficulty of voir dire, and the testimony of the 
jurors selected, and notwithstanding their asertions to the con-
trary, the jurors could not render a verdict based solely upon 
the evidence presented. Resp therefore had shown the actual 
prejudice arising from the pretrial publicity necessary to estab-
lish a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amdts. 
CONTENTIONS: Aside from the general charge that the CA3 
erred in its finding of actual prejudice under the facts of this 
case, Petr contends that the CA3 improperly applied in the 
present case the the standards set forth in Marshall v. United 
States, 360 u.s. 310 {1959). 
DISCUSSION: Petr's contention that the CA3 erred in finding 
actual prejudice under the facts of this case is fact-bound. 
While I am not entirely confident that the CA3 reached the cor-
rect decision on this point, it does not seem to be of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant review by this Court. The facts were pains-
takingly detailed and obviously carefully considered by the CA. 
,_. _..... ----
Petr does not elaborate on his assertion that the CA3 
applied--and improperly so--the standards set forth in Marshall 
v. United States. But it appears that his argument is that a 
federal court on habeas may not presume prejudice, despite juror 
assurances of impartiality, simply from the fact that the jurors 
have learned of potentially prejudicial information from the me-
dia. And that this is what the CA3 did. In Marshall, this Court 
reversed a conviction and ordered a new trial for a federal of-
fender where it was shown that seven jurors had been exposed to 
news accounts of the defendant's prior crimes and arrests, even 
though all of the jurors exposed to the accounts had informed the 
trial judge that he or she would not be influenced by the ac-
counts and would decide the case solely on the evidence present-
ea. Petr is correct that Marshall was not intended to apply to 
state courts; this was made explicit in Murphy v. Florida, supra. 
at 797-798. YMarshall was but an exercise of the i-
s~~ over the federal courts. However, there is nothing to 
suggest that the CA3 applied the Marshall test in this case. To 
the contrary, the court recognized that, 
/ 
[u]nlike a defendant seeking review of his federal con-
viction, [Respl cannot argue that simply because his 
jury has read of extra-record facts with a high poten-
tial for prejudice, a federal court must presume that 
the jury was prejudiced. [Resp) must therefore 
show "that the publicity has been so extreme as to 
cause actual prejudice to a degree rendering a fair 
trial impossible." 
The CA3 thus di~ea any reliance upon Marshall. The showing 
required by the CA3, together with its insistence upon an evalua-
tion on the basis of the "totality of the circumstances" is fully 
consistent with this Court's decisions in Murphy v. Florida, 
supra., ana Irvin v. Dowa, supra. 
I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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Cammie R. Robinson Patton v. Yount February 26, 1984 
~~~tion~d~ ~~ 
ze~IA-~vt-~~ 
t-o hJ h' \.: . ~/fh . 
Has respon~ent met IS uurden of proving t at pretrial 
publicity caused actual prejudice in the jury selection such that 
he was denied his 6th Amendment right to trial by an impartial 
jury. 
Facts & Decisions Below 
CA3 rejected the state TC's finding that pretrial 
publicity required a change of venue for respondent's retrial, 
which was held 4 years after his original trial and conviction. 
CA3 therefore ordered that a writ of habeas corpus should issue 
unless the state granted a new trial within a specified period of 
time. 
Discussion 
It is hard to find a certworthy issue in this 
essentially factbound case. I assume the issue is whether CA3 
correctly applied the principles of Irvin v. Dowd, 366 u.s. 717 
(1961), and Murhpy v. Florida, 421 u.s. 794 (1975), in 
determining whether pretrial publicity denied respondent his 
constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. 
In a habeas proceeding challenging a state court 
conviction, this Court in Irvin considered under what 
circumstances pretrial publicity may preclude a fair trial. The 
Court held that "the mere existence of any preconceived notion as 
to the guilt or innoncence of an accused, without more, is [not] 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's 
impartiality." 366 u.s., at 723. The defendant must show that a 
prospective juror has an 1 ~ctual bia~ \that he is incapable of 
putting aside. Id. Nevertheless, the Court held that the mere 
statement by the juror during voir dire that he will be impartial 
is not conclusive. "Actual bias" may be shown from other 
evidence. In ~in, the Court found actual bias from the 
following evidence: 
(1) a pattern of community bias against the defendant was 
- ------·----.,. 
revealed in the media, 366 u.s., at 725; 
(2) that pattern was repeated in the voir dire testimony of 
90% of those questioned, id., at 726; 
(3) thus, the court should discount proclamations of 
impartiality by those actually seated: "Where so many, so many 
times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can 
~ ' 
be given little weight." Id., at 728. 
CA3 found "actual bias" in the case on precisely the C If 3 
same evidence: _______. ~ 
(l)"The publicity preceding petitioner's trial was extensive~ 
and had great potential for prejudice." Cert. Pet., at 25a This 
created a pattern of community bias. -
(2) Voir dire testimony reflected this pattern -- 126 of theJ 2 ~ 
163 veniremen questioned (77%) admitted to prejudicial bias that ~ 
they were incapable of setting aside. Cert. Pet., at 28a. 
(3) Because of this, the proclamations of impartiality by the 
12 seated jurors should be discounted and respondent has met his 
burden of proving actual bias. Cert. Pet., at 30a. 
CA3's application of ~~~ Irvin analysis is troubling 
because it seems to ignore §2254(d). CA3's determination that 
there was extensive pretrial publicity directly contradicts the 
TC's finding that "there had been 'practically no publicity' 
during the four years between trial and retrial, and 'practical 
no public interest' shown at the second trial." But see Cert. 
Pet. at 26a, n.21 (TC's finding that there was no pretrial 
publicity not substantially supported by the record -- an 
exception to §2254(d)). Although Irvin had held that the 
4 --------
question whether a juror's opinion is sufficiently strong to 
constitute unconstitutional bias is a mixed question of law and 
fact that the federal court is required to evaluate 
independently, the question of the existence and extent of 
pretrial publicity in a community is a pure question of fact and 
is best resolved by the TC. Thus, application of the Irvin 
analysis in this case is problematic. 
Since Irvin, this Court has made clear that in habeas 
actions the petitioner must show that jurors had an "actual 
prejudice" against him. Murphy v. Florida, 421 u.s. 794 (1975). 
In the interest of comity, the Court thereby refused to extend to 
state court convictions the rule employed in federal courts that 
"persons who have learned from news sources of a defendant's 
prior criminal record are presumed to be prejudiced." Id., at 
798 (referring to the rule of Marshall v. United States, 360 u.s. 
310 (1959)). Murphy did not repudiate, however, the rule of 
Irvin that actual prejudice may be shown from evidence other than 
the testimony of the impaneled jurors in cases "where most 
veniremen will admit to a disqualifying prejudice." Id., at 803. 
The Court held in Murphy, however, that where only 20 of 78 
veniremen admitted to a disqualifying prejudice, it would not 
disregard the testimony of those jurors who had stated that they 
could be impartial. 
Contrary to petr's assertion, CA3 did not violate the 
principles announced in Murphy. Where on the spectrum between 
Murphy and Irvin this case falls is a (close c!!J and is 
essentially factbound. Nevertheless, the case points out a 
troubling aspect of the Irvin analysis that is exaggerated by 
CA3's application in this case. 
Irvin looks to the testimony of all veniremen to 
determine whether those actually seated as jurors have an "actual 
prejudice" against the defendant despite their testimony to the 
contrary. The principle is "[w]here so many, so many times, 
admitted prejudice," statements of impartiality by the twelve 
seated jurors should be given little weight. The problem with 2 r-~ 
that principle is that it repudiates the very purpose of voir 5 
dire. As Judge Garth's concurring opinion points out: "A --
thoroughly and skillfully conducted voir dire should be adequate 
to identify juror bias, even in a community saturated with 
publicity adverse to the defendant." Cert. Pet., at 47a. There 
has been no allegation here that the voir dire was skimpy or 
procedurally unfair. To the contrary, CA3 expressly acknowledged 
tJwt:rt-r 
~ 
1::::1 that the TC "extend[ed] great leniency to petitioner in his 
questioning of the veniremen. Such leniency was commendable." ~ 
~ Cert. Pet., at 28a n. 23. Thus, it is not manifestly c.lear that 
the court should presume, without specific evidence, that the 
~ 
l 
voir dire was ineffective. That is, however, precisely what 
Irvin~lows and what CA3 did in this case. ~
On the other hand, I do not think that this Court sh~ 
reject Irvin altogether. In rare cases of extreme pretrial 
publicity, the Irvin analysis may be necessary Irvin itself 
was such a case. However, the analysis should be used sparingly. 
I think that Judge Garth's concurring opinion presents a 
compelling argument that the Court need not decide whether 
application of the Irvin presumption is proper in this case. See 
'----·----------------=---------------------------
Cert. Pet., at 45a-53a. Briefly, his argument runs as follows: 
(1) a defendant proves denial of his 6th Amendment right to 
trial by an impartial jury if he demonstrates the actual 
existence o~reju~ise attributable to pretrial publicity on the 
part of one or more jurors, Irvin, 366 u.s., at 723. 
(2) a defendant may establish by means of a seated juror's 
voir dire testimony that he had a preconceived opinion of 
defendant's guilt that he was incapable of setting aside. 
(3) Yount has demonstrated in this case the actual existence l~ 
of prejudice on the part of ~ of the sea ted jurors -- Hr in. ~ )1 ~1-
Hrin's voir dire testimony indicated that he "would require X,Qunt bfOJA....(... 
to produce evidence before [he] would abandon his -preconceived ~ 
opinion of Yount's guilt." Cert. Pet., at Sla. 
(4) this was sufficient to meet Yount's burden of proving 
that pretrial publicity resulted in the selection of one or more 
jurors who had "actual bias" as required by Murphy. Cert. Pet., 
at 5la. 
Judge Garth's analysis is preferrable both because it is 
narrow and because it avoids the §2254(d) problem encountered by 
the majority opinion. Under Irvin, a determination whether a 
juror has an unconstitutionally b~on is a mixed 
? 
question of law and fact for the federal court to decide. 366 
u.s., at 723. 
I recommend that this Court affirm for the reasons 
articualted by Judge Garth. Under that rationale, the Court need 
not decide whether the Constitution required the state TC to 
grant a change of venue. It need only address the question 
whether respondent has met his burden of proving that pretrial 
publicity resulted in the selection of a juror who harbored an 
"actual bias." 
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Lewis, 
,jnvrtmt Qfllltrt llf tqt 1ltnittb ,jtaft.tl' 
~lhu~qingtlln, !(l. <If . 2ll~~$ 
March 2, 1984 
No. 83-95, Patton v. Yount 
Forgive me for sending you another letter. You have 
enough to read without this added burden. I write because you 
are always willing to listen and because it seems most 
unfortunate to resolve this case by an equally divided Court. 
You qualified your vote to affirm as being "tentative" and I hope 
you might be persuaded to consider a reversal. 
I take it from your discussion of the case that you were 
not persuaded to affirm on the basis of Judge Hunter's conclusion 
that juror bias should be implied from the pre-trial puqlicity. 
You spoke instead of Judge Garth's opinion concerning "actual 
bias" of Juror Hrin. I respect Judge Garth very much. He sat 
with me recently on the National Moot Court Finals. He is a fine 
judge, but I believe he is in error in this case. 
The question of juror Hrin's bias was not properly raised 
for Judge Garth's review, I believe. The habeas petition 
includes only a vague reference that "two [jurors] stated they 
would require [respondent] to prove his innocence." App. 302a. 
~ 1 In contrast to Judge Garth, I believe this reference was to 
{ jurors 2 and 10 (Clair Clapsaddle and Albert Undercoffer), both 
of whom expressed confusion concerning whether respondent had the 
• burden of proof or not. Possibly, the reference could be to 
jurors 3 and 12, the two other seated jurors that respondent 
challenged for cause. The District Court certainly did not 
believe the issue of juror ifri'n' s "actual bias 11 was raised, for 
i £_ assessed"' cause chaileriges to six specific jurors, and did not 
eyen men1;~on, ju~ror Hr in. The issue of juror Hr in's "actual bias" 
certainly was not •iset forth [as a] specific groun [d] upon which 
relief [was available]. 28 u.s.c. foll. §§2254 (Rule 2(c) 
governing habeas petitions). 
Second, I do not think Judge Garth properly applied the 
presumption of correctness required by the habeas statute, 28 
u.s.c. §2254(d). Irvin v. Dowd characterized the issue of 
legally "implied" bias as a "question of mixed law and fact," and 
deference on that issue is therefore not required. But a 
question of "actual bias," based solely on the answers given at 
the voir dire, is a "question of historical fact" for which the 
presumption of correctness applies. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 
U.S. 209, 216-218 (1982); Rushen v. Spain, U.S. , 
(1983). Judge Garth should have deferred to the trial judge's 
findings, which certainly find "fair support" in the record. 
L. 
Finally, like you, I have carefuliy reviewed the entire 
colloquy between juror Hrin and respondent's trial counsel. In 
many ways, it was like colloquy I heard when I was a state court 
judge. Prospective jurors are not lawyers, and they take their 
temporary roles in the legal system with great seriousness and 
sincerity. Lawyers sometimes confuse them with hypotheticals, 
and they answers questions in ways that, looking at a cold 
record, might seem unusual. They do not watch for the legal 
nuances of their utterances. But all we are looking for is an 
opel) mind, and I believe j ur,or Ig.,in ad t at. --Juror :Hr ln openly 
and honestly admitted that he had read about respondent in the 
newspaper. He admitted that he had an opinion. But he also 
insisted, repeatedly, that he would not be inflexible, that he 
would follow the judge's instructions, and that he would hear the 
case with an open mind. Juror Hrin was a chemist, a man trained 
in and proud of scientific objectivity. He promised to judge the 
case on the facts presented, and that is all the Sixth Amendment 
requires. It is easy for us, fourteen years later, to pour over 
that colloquy and detect awkward statements that indicate 
inflexible bias. But we were not in that courtroom; we have no 
ability to judge his credibility and veracity. The trial judge, 
however, was there and could. That judge expressly denied the 
challenge for cause because he believe what juror Hrin said; he 
concluded that Hrin "could disregard [his opinion] and be guided 
by the law and evidence." App. 87a. Indeed, respondent's trial 
counsel may ultimately have concurred in that assessment, for 
after further questioning he accepted juror Hrin, did not renew 
his challen~e for cause, and did not challenge juror Hrin on a 
peremptory basis although he had some peremptory challenges 
remaining. 
Actual juror bias is a "question of historical fact" to 
which the presumption of correctness applies. Perhaps juror Hrin 
should have been dismissed, and perhaps venue should have been 
changed. But can we, fourteen years later, be so sure that 
respondent did not have a trial by an impartial jury when the 
state trial judge, the state supreme court, and the Federal 
habeas court all thought he had? 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this. Having 
had to face many such questions on the bench I feel it would be 
very helpful if we could write an opinion in this case reversing 




March 6, 1984 
RE: No. 83-95, Patton v. Yount 
TO: Justice PowelL ( 
FRa-1 : Ca mrn i e 
On reexamination, I am beginning to have some doubts as --
to the soundness of Judge Garth~s analysis. He has made the dis-
tinction between a finding of "actual bias," which concededly is 
a "question of historical fact" governed by §2254 (d), and the -
legal determination whether a juror's opinion is such as to raise _____ ____. 
the presumption of partiality, which is not governed by §2254(d). 
The distinction applies Irvin v. Dowd correctly. When applied to 
an individual juror, however, it is a distinction that seems to 
be one that is based more on semantics than reality. In the end, 
Judge Garth's analysis may have the undesirable effect of making 
it easier for habeas courts to second guess the voir dire rulings 
of trial courts than would the majority's analysis. 
Irvin v. Dowd sets forth an analysis that should be used 
only in rare cases of extreme pretrial publicity. In those 
cases, the question is whether the pretrial publicity is such as 
to create a presumption of partiality on the part of any or all 
the jurors. According to Irvin, that question is a legal one and 
is . not governed by §2254(d). However, its use easily may be lim-
ited to cases of extreme pretrial publicity. See, e.g., Murphy 
v. Florida, 421 u.s. 794 (1975). Under Judge Garth's analysis, 
the determination that one juror's voir dire testimony creates a 
presumption of partiality seems to be nothing more than a repudi-
~.._, 
ation of the trial judge's credibility assessment. Because Judge 
I 
Garth relied solely on Hrin's voir dire testimony, and not on the 
L - - _ __,
extensive pretrial publicity crucial to the majority's analysis, 
his analysis is not as easily limited to those rare cases of ex-
treme publicity. Because Judge Hunter makes it clear that this --
is an unusual case in which 126 of the 163 veniremen (77%) admit-
ted bias, the majority's opinion may be the narrower of the two. 
I am afraid this is something I had not thought of on first anal-
ysis. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.iuvnw <lj:llltrt d tqt ,nittb .ihdt-« 
Jla,gfri:ngton, ~. <!J:. 2ll~'!!,1 
March 8, 1984 
No. 83-95 Patton v. Yount 
Dear Lewis, 
I am absolutely delighted to read your memo 
in this case. If the other votes remain as before, we 
should be able to decide it by a useful opinion clarifying 
the points made in your memo. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
CHAM ltERS 0,. 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.hprtmt Q1&mrt of tift ~b .tbdt• 
•••Jrtnlton. ~. Q1. 20~"'' 
March 8, 1984 
83-95 Patton v. Yount 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In view of the evenly divided Court, this case was 
carried forward to be considered further at our next Confer-
ence. Although I was unpersuaded by CA3's majority opinion, 
I voted at Conference to affirm on the grounds announced in 
Judge Garth's concurring opinion. That vote was tentative, 
as I stated. 
Judge Garth relied on language in Irvin v. Dowd to 
find that juror Hrin's ambiguous voir dire testimony 
"raise{d] the presumption of partiality.• 366 u.s., at 723. 
Again relying on Irvin, Judge Garth characterized that de-
termination as a question of law rather than a question of 
historical fact. Cert. Pet., at 52a. Bearing in mind that 
this case is here on federal habeas corpus, and after a fur-
ther review of Irvin, Judge Garth's opinion, and other rele-
vant cases, I now question the soundness of that character-
ization. Whether Hrin's voir dire testimony evidences "ac-
tual bias" is a credibility determination and seems more a 
question of fact than a mixed question of law and fact. See 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 216-218 (198 2) (existence 
of "actual biasn on part of a juror is a question of his-
torical fact the resolution of which is entitled on federal 
habeas to a presumption of correctness under S2254(d))J 
Rushen v. Spain, u.s. (1983) (same). 
There is language in Irvin that supports Judge 
Garth's view that federal habeas courts may find a •presump-
tion of partiality" as a matter of law. See 366 u.s., at 
723. On further reflection, however, I am inclined to think 
that Judge Garth's reliance on that language is misplaced. 
The pertinent language in Irvin suggests that extreme pre-
trial publicity may create, as a matter of law, a "presump-
tion of prejudice" with respect to the jury panel. It does 
not suggest, however, that in habeas corpus proceedings fed~ 
eral courts may rely exclusively on voir dire testimony to 
repudiate assessments of juror bias made by state trial 
courts. Thus, I believe that under S2254(d), Judge Garth 
' . 
2. 
was required to presume the correctness of the state courts' 
assessment of Hrin's "actual bias." 
Attached hereto are portions of Hrin's voir dire 
testimony that in my view support the conclusions reached by 
three of the four courts that have considered Hrin's eligi-
bility to sit as a juror. As indictated in these pages, 
after defense counsel recorded his "challenge for cause,• 
the trial court held that Hrin's ambiguous responses did not 
reflect a "fixed opinion.• This prompted defense counsel 
again to ask Hrin whether he could enter the jury box with 
an open mind. Hrin responded: 
"I think I could enter it [the "jury box"] 
with a very open mind. I think I could very 
easily. To say this is a requirement for 
some of the things you have to do every day." 
J.A. 89a. 
Defense counsel asked no further questions relevant to bias. 
Nor did he renew his prior challenge for cause. This testi-
mony s~pports the trial court's determination that Hrin was 
prepared to render an impartial verdict. 
If we were to affirm CA3 on the reasoning of Judge 
Garth, we would invite federal courts on habeas to make fac-
tual judgments as to juror bias whenever a federal judge 
thought an error had been made. Of the many "judgment 
calls" that trial judges must make, not many depend as much 
on the judge's discretion as whether a juror is qualified to 
sit. Jurors vary widely in experience, education, sophisti-
cation, and -- under the pressure of examination by opposing 
counsel -- frequently will give ambiguous answers as to 
their preconceived opinions. The scope and extent of the 
voir dire also vary widely, and inform the judge who over-
sees it. A trial judge, observing the questioning and the 
demeanor of the prospective jurors, is in a far better posi-
tion than appellate judges to determine juror fitness. 
In sum, I conclude that the "presumption of preju-
dice" envoked in Irvin v. Dowd is not applicable to the 
facts of this case, and that the "actual bias" of juror Hrin 
is a question of historical fact to be resolved by the state 
court and entitled to a presumption of correctness under 
S2254(d) --a presumption that Judge Garth did not engage. 
I therefore would reverse. 
~.J.i7. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
86a ]ames F. Hrin- Voir J)ire 
A. Since there's nothing else in my mind except 
what I originally read, right. The fact that there has 
been a new trial re-scheduled may cause some doubt 
as to the original facts. 
was. 
Q. But it hasn't changed your opinion? 
A. Well the opinion isn't as solid as it originally 
Q. But it still is solid-not as solid-but solid? 
A. Right. 
[443] Q. Spoken like a true engineer. 
A. Not an engineer-I'm a chemist. 
BY MR. KING: 
We would challenge for cause. 
BY. MR. FENNELL: 
We would answer the challenge before the 
Court's ruling. He has already declared he could 
decide the verdict solely upon the evidence and 
law presented and he definitely said he could. 
BY MR. SABINO: 
Your Honor, I think we went through this 
matter yesterday. 
BY THE COURT: 
I don't think his answer is that he could not 
enter the jury box with an open mind. He said he 
could go in with an open mind and therefore I 
deny the challenge for cause. I deny the challenge 
for cause because he declared he could go in there 
with an open mind; and Commonwealth against 
88a }ames F. Hrin- Voir Dire 
Q. But you would still require evidence to be 
presented before you could in fact change your opin-
ion- is that what you said? 
A. The fact that the trial has been reopened in-
dicates that there may be something left unopened. I 
said my opinion is not as solid and possibly I could 
enter the box with an open mind. I think I do this 
every day. You try out processes that you're sure are 
going to work and you definitely change your mind. I 
don't know if that's the answer you want. 
Q. Regardless whether it's the answer we want, 
we are just trying to get an answer too so we can 
judge you and decide upon you. 
A. It's rather difficult to live in DuBois and get 
the paper and find out what the people are talking 
about- at least the local [ 445] people without having 
some opinion or at least reserving some opinion. 
Q. That's very true. And you do have and have 
had an opinion? 
A. I had an opinion, right. 
Q. The question now is then Mr. Hrin, is 
whether or not you can set that opinion aside before 
hearing any of the facts or evidence- set it aside 
before you enter the jury box; not after, but before. 
Can you do that? 
A. The opinion isn't as solid- to completely 
wipe-or forget what I had heard previously about 
the case-
Q. You still remember that? 
7rin- Voir Dire 
still require evidence to be 
tld in fact change your opin. 
lid? 
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·'= 
]ames F. Hrin- Voir Dire 89a 
A. I remember reports about it or talking about 
it_ to be honest with you · I didn't really read all the 
articles in the paper because I know they were 
possibly played up a little. I didn't particularly like 
the man that wrote the article so I didn't take too 
much time. Everybody is entitled to their own views 
on personalities, but when I started to read it, it 
sounded like a fiction story and I don't care to read 
fiction. 
Q. Mr. Hrin, I have to come back to the ques-
tion that- can you put aside whatever opinion you 
had -solid, unsolid or however you want to describe it 
-can you set it aside before you go into the jury box 
or would you need some evidence before you could 
change your mind? Now think about it for a second. 
A. I have to. 
Q. Give me yes or no? 
A. I think I could enter it with a very open 
mind. I think I could [ 446] very easily. To say this is a 
requirement for some of the things you have to do 
every day. ., 
Q. Then let me ask you one more question Mr. 
Hrin - we have asked you a number of questions and 
we try to find things here, but do you know of any 
reason that I may not have touched upon why you 
should not be a juror in this case? 
A. Outside of the fact that you'd be locked up 
for three weeks which wouldn't be a very pleasant ex-
perience. 
Q. Does the thought of that effect you in such a 
way that you feel you could not be a juror? 
CHAMI!II!:R8 0,. 
jlu.prtm.t afouri of tltt ~h .itatt• 
.a&Jlfin¢&tn. J. <q. 2llp'l~ 
,• 
.~ 
THE CHIEF' .JUSTICE March 12, 1984 
.. ·,, 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 83-95- Patton v. Yount 
In light of Lewis' memorandum of March 8, 1984, 




TO: Joe DATE: March 14, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-95 Patton v. Yount 
In reading Bose Corp., 82-1246, I note that Jus-
tice Stevens speaks of the "special deference [to] be given 
to a trial judge's credibility determination". P. 13. In 
Patton, although voir dire is not precisely comparable to 
oral testimony
1
it does require a determination by the trial 
judge of credibility in light of the facts and circum-
stances. See my memorandum to the Conference resulting in 
our being assigned the case. 
Of course, there is nothing new or special about 
according deference to a trial court's credibility determi-









FROM: Lewis F. PowelJ, Jr. 
83-95 Patton v. Yount 
March 14 , 19 8 4 
In reading Bose Corp., 82-1246, I note that Jus-
tice Stevens speaks of the "special deference [to] be given 
to a trial judge's credibility determination". P. 13. In 
Patton, although _voir dire is not precisely comparable to 
oral testimony it does require a determination by the trial 
judge of credibility in light of the facts and circum-
stances. See my memorandum to the Conference resulting in 
our being assigned the case. 
Of course, there is nothing new or special about 
according deference to a trial court's credibility determi-
nations. I mention this onlv because it is a current 
statement. 
r ... F.P., Jr. 
ss 
83-95 Patton v. Yount 1st Draft 04/06/84 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial 
. publicity so infected a state criminal trial as to deny 
the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial 
jury." 
I 
On Apr i 1 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-
year-old high school student, was found in a wooded area 
near her home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, 
Pennsylvania. There were numerous wounds about her head, 
apparently caused by a blunt instrument. There were also 
cuts caused by a sharp instrument on her throat and neck. 
One of her stockings was knotted and tied around her neck. 
An autopsy revealed that she died of strangulation when 
blood from her wounds was drawn into her lungs. The 
autopsy showed no indication that she had been sexually 
assaulted. 
2. 
At about 5:45 a.m. the following morning, respondent 
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby 
DuBois. An officer opened the door. Yount stated, "I am 
the man you are looking for." The officer asked whether 
he was referring to "the incident in Luthersburg." You~ 
responded that he was. 
A detective was alerted, and he and Yount 
went into a smaller adjacent office. The detective asked, 
"Why are we looking for you?" Yount replied, "I killed 
that girl." "What girl?" the detective asked, and Yount 
responded, "Pamela Rimer." The detective then asked, "How 
did you kill this girl?" Yount answered, "I struck her 
with a wrench and I choked her." The detective then 
advised Yount of his rights, and Yount subsequently gave 
full oral and written confessions. Yount had been the 
victim's high school mathematics teacher. 
""""' 19 ~ tD} 
At his trial, these confessions were admitted into 
t1 
evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed temporary 
insanity. The jury convicted him of first degree murder 
and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On 
direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined 
that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 u.s. 436 (1966), police 
had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an 
3. 
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for 
a new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d 
464 (1969}, cert. denied, 397 u.s. 925 (1970}. 
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court 
ordered suppression of Yount's oral and written 
confessions, and of the question "How did you kill this 
girl?" and its answer. The prosecution dismissed the rape 
charge. There followed an extensive voir dire that is now 
at the heart of this case. Jury selection began on 
N:>vember 4, 1970, and took ten days, seven jury panels, 
292 veniremen, and 1186 pages of testimony. Yount moved 
for a change of venue before, and several times during, 
the voir dire. He argued that the widespread 
dissemination of prejudicial information could not be 
eradicated from the minds of potential jurors, and cited 
in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numerous 
newspaper and other articles about the case. The motions 
were denied. The trial court noted that the articles 
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the 
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's 
leniency in allowing examinations and challenges of the 
jurors; that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated 
had "no prior or present fixed opinion"; that there had 
4. 
~~e. .. ~~~ 4-J.. 
• j 
been "practically no publicity given to th1s matter;; and 
"little, if any, talk in public" between the two trialsrr ' 
~ 
an.Q-.t.Q.at ~e second trialAhad been~ sparsely attended. 
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were 
seated. At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand 
and did not claim temporary insanity. Instead he relied 
upon cross-examination and character witnesses, in an 
attempt to undermine the State's proof of his intent. The 
jury convicted him again of first-degree murder, and he 
was resentenced to life imprisonment. The trial court 
denied a motion for a new trial, finding that practically 
no publicity had been given to the case between the two 
~
trials, and that p£ae~call~ ~ public interest was shown 
1\ 
during the second trial. In addition, the court concluded 
that the jury was without bias. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed the conviction and the trial court's 
findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, ---, 314 
A.2d 242,--- (1974). 
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in United States District Court. He 
claimed, inter alia, that his conviction had been obtained 
in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right 
to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The case was 
5. 
assigned to a magistrate, who conducted a hearing and 
recommended that the petition be granted. The magistrate 
examined the voir dire testimony and found that the jury 
at Yount's second trial was not capable and wi 11 ing to 
decide the case on the evidence before it: rather, the 
magistrate concluded, the jury would have required Yount 
to prove his innocence or overcome strong preconceived 
notions of guilt. 
'Ihe District Court rejected the magistrate's 
recommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Pa. 1982). It 
held that the pretrial publicity was neither vicious nor 
excessive, and that the jurors were able to set aside any 
preconceived notions. It noted that the percentage of 
jurors excused for cause, at least as to the first panel, 
was "not remarkable to anyone familiar with the difficulty 
of selecting a homicide jury in Pennsylvania." ~ at --
~ Finally, the court reviewed the instances in which the 
~~trial court had denied a challenge for cause, and upheld 
the trial court's view that the jury was impartial. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 
710 F. 2d 9 56 ( 19 8 3) • Judge Hunter, joined by Judge 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
6. 
Stern 1, relied primarily on the analysis set out in Irvin 
v. Dowd, 366 u.s. 712 (1961), in finding that Yount's 
trial was not fundamentally fair. First, the Court of 
App=~amined the nature of the publicity surrounding 
the trial. It found that that publicity revealed Yount's 
i\ 
prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his prior 
plea of temporary insanity, information that was not 
admitted into evidence at trial. While the court 
recognized that "[t]he passage of time may work to erase 
highly unfavorable publicity from the memory of the 
community," 710 F.2d, at 969, it found that newspaper 
coverage of the appeal and retrial, and the intensity of 
the initial publicity, served to poison the general 
atmosphere during the second trial. 2 
1Judge Stern, a United States District Judge for the 
District of New Jersey, was sitting by designation. 
2The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair 
support in the record the trial court's conclusion that 
there was practically no publicity given to the case 
between the first and second trials. See 710 F.2d, at 
969, n. 21. The federal court noted that the trial court 
record contained at least 17 front-page articles published 
d,u£il"t~ #at time in the Clearfield County papers. The 
record on the habeas petition indicated that 66 fro t-page 
articles were published covering the appeal and the second 
trial as a whole. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
'Ihe court then examined the voir dire for further 
evidence of community sentiment. Independently examining 
the testimony, the court found that of 163 veniremen 
q.Jestioned about the case, 3 all but two said they had 
heard of the case from the media, and 126, or 77%, 
admitted they would carry an opinion into the jury box. 
One hundred seventeen, 72%, were excused on challenges for 
cause. The court compared these statistics to the numbers 
m Irvin. There, the trial court had dismissed for cause 
268 of 430 veniremen, or 62%, because they had fixed 
opinions concerning the petitioner's guilt. 
t.-k.... ~ 
those examined entert~some opinion as 
"'\ 
Almost 90% of 
to guilt. In 
addition, the court noted testimony at the voir dire that 
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial 
court's view that there was little talk in public 
concerning the second trial was undermined by the voir 
dire testimony that there had been public discussion of <ftC 
the case, particularly in the last weeks before retrial. 
~ at 969, n. 22. The ~Ea.l court discounted >as of ,;.,-
limited significance , the tr1al court's point that few ~ 
spectators had attended the trial, since Yount did not 
allege prejudice arising from the "'circus atmosphere'" in 





hundred twenty-five of the original 292 
were excused because they had not been chosen 
Four others were dismissed for cause before 
questioned on the case. 
8. 
parishoners had tried to influence a minister 1 S wife to 
vote guilty, and testimony at the habeas hearing that one 
venireman apparently veiled his strong feelings about the 
case when testifying. {Neither was seated.} 
F . 11 th ~f.vJt ~~d h . d' . 1na y, e ~a3~lt~-e£lrnTned t e vo1r 1re test1mony 
" of those jurors eventually seated. It found that "[t]he 
prejudice permeating the voir dire and the community was 
reflected in the voir dire testimony of the majority" of 
the jurors and alternates. Id., at 971. It noted that 
all but one of the jurors were familiar with the case, and 
several explicitly recalled petitioner 1 s conviction and 
confessions. Eight out of the fourteen jurors and 
alternates admitted that they had formed an opinion as to 
~u,.,J~ct-3'$' ;i1 "CJS~:;_~-----
Yount 1 s gui 1 t. 4 ~The- .ms.Jg~ thought that many)\ gave 
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set 
aside their opinions and forget what they had heard, and 
that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both alternates would have 
required evidence to overcome their beliefs. The ~
1 
"conclude[d] that despite their assurances 
4The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin 
twelve jurors had formed opinions of guilt. 
of 
9. 
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their 
opinions and render a verdict based solely on the evidence 
n...t-~f' 
presented." Id., at 972 • .lot held that pretrial publicity 
1 
made a fair trial impossible in Clearfield County. 5 
Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to 
join the majority's view that actual prejudice on the part 
of the jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and 
the answers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the 
jury. He wrote that "(a] thorough and skillfully 
conducted voir dire should be adequate to identify juror 
bias, even in a community saturated with publicity adverse 
to the defendant." at 979. 6 Judge Garth 
5Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring op1n1on in 
which he suggested that "the constitutional standard which 
for 175 years has guided the lower courts" in this area be 
rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than hinge 
disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed 
opinion of guilt that he cannot lay aside, Judge Stern 
would bar any juror who admitted any opinion as to guilt. 
Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where more than 25% 
of the veniremen state that they held an opinion 
concerning the defendant's guilt. This would raise such 
doubts as to the sincerity of those who claimed no opinion 
as to suggest ~~n bias, Judge Stern wrote. 
1\ 
6Judge Garth thought Irvin was distinguishable, 
because there "the trial court {which itself questioned 
the jurors challenged for cause) did not engage in a 
searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
10. 
nevertheless concurred because in his view juror Hrin 
stated at voir dire that he would have required evidence 
to change his mind about Yount's guilt. This stripped the 
defendant of the presumption of innocence. 7 
~ 
{reverse. 
u.s. (1983), and we now 
II 
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision 
19/.:JI 
that the jury was not impartial on this Court's decision 
1\ 
in Irvin v. Dowd, supra. 
because Irvin is factually distinguishable 
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions 
that each could render an impartial verdict 
notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge Garth also 
noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the 
actual jurors. 
7Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was 
unconstitutionally biased was a mixed question of law and 
fact under Irvin. 710 F.2d, at 981. He therefore did not 
apply the presumption of correctness that is applicable to 
the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas 
corpus proceeding, 28 u.s.c. §2254(d). 
lfp/ss 04/06/84 Rider A, p. 10 (Yount) 
' 
We granted certiorari, --u.s. ( 1983) , to 
consider, in the context of this case, the problem of 
pervasive media publicity that now arises so frequently in 
the trial of sensational criminal cases. We reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
lfp/ss 04/06/84 Rider B, p. 10 (Yount) 
/""(---- That decision, a leading one at the time, is 
certainly relevant. We do not view it as controlling. 
There are significant distinctions between Irvin and this 
fTrt- ~~· tb..J} ~~ .J-.,.1. Q 
case. Here, the s~Q juryAwas chosen four years after 
the first trial when the great volume of publicity had 
occurred and feeling in the community was at its height. 
< • 
---~. - ~~------------~ 
lfp/ss 04/06/84 Rider A, p. 10 (Yount) 
We granted certiorari, --u.s. ( 1983) , to 
consider, in the context of this case, the problem of 
11. 
is that here when the second jury 
years had 
In Irvin the Court 
that it was during the six or seven months immediately 
preceding trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines, 
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the 
defendant.]" 366 u.s., at 725. Here, on the other hand, 
the great bulk of the prejudicial publicity--both in 
~antity and in the harshness of its tone--occurred prior 
to and during the first trial, four years before the jury 
was chosen in this case. 
'lbe record available to us reveals that in the year 
before the start of the second voir dire each of the two 
Clearfield County daily newspapers published less than one 
article per month. App. 649a-657a: Ex. Pl-z to Pl-kk: Ex. 
P-2. More important, many of these were extremely brief 
announcements of the trial dates and scheduling such as 
are common in rural newspapers. E.g • , Ex • P 1- f f , P 1- i i , 
Pl-jj. The transcript of the voir dire contains numerous 
references to the sparse publicity and minimal public 
interest prior to the second trial. ~ App. 43a, 98a, 
100a: Tr. 18, 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 711, 829, 1142. It is 




articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were 
purely factual articles discussing not the crime or prior 
prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selection. 
App. 658a-67la. In short, the record of publicity in the 
, ~ A--f ~ .j......c.-c.t..(. ~ , 
months preceding the second trial does not reveal the 
1\ 
"barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to 
trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 u.s. 794, 798 (1975), 
amounting to a "huge • • • wave of public pass ion," 
/'1...1-~
Irvin, 
supra, at 728, that ~ found in Irvin. 
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in 
time had a profound effect on the community and, more ~/A)~ %9 
~ ~, ::;r:::::e::n,th:f j~:::s:~ :~:;:;i::t o:h:f:::~:glsop:fni::: 
~~ 9,..#"'-- case slip from their mind. ~ App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284, 
~r~~~. 541-544, 991. In addition, while it is true that a number 
~; i r~ of jurors and veniremen testified that at one time they 
lA> 
had had opinions, for many, time had weakened or 
eliminated any conviction they had had. The testimony of 
juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during examination by 
defense counsel illustrates this process: 
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed 
011er the years? 
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard 
too much about it. 
// "Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before 
,/ you knew about it then? 
( "A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And just recently when this matter was 
coming up again, I presume? 
I. 
"A. What I have read in the paper again. 








Not too many so far. 
You have heard other people expree:; 
about it? 
Not too many of those so far too. 
Back around '66, did you? 
Yes in '66. 
"Q. I assume you had an opinion as to 
[Mr. Yount's] guilt or innocence? 
"A. I had an opinion yes. 
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to h~ 
guilt or innocence? 
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not 
sure now. It was in the paper he plead [sic] 
not guilty. 
"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you 
do have an opinion, could you wipe it out of 
your mind--erase it out of your mind before you 
would take a seat in the jury box and hear 
whatever evidence you might hear? 
"A. As it is right now I have no opinim 
now--four or five years ago I probably did but 
right now I don't. 
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between 
then and now to eliminate that opinion if you 
can tell me? 
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there 
wasn't much in the paper about it and it sort of 
slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a. 
13. 
14. 
Other jurors testified to the same effect. See App. 128a 
(juror number 8) ; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 
10) . And the transcript of the voir dire as a whole 
reveals that the opinions of a fair portion of the 
community generally underwent the same process. ~ Tr. 
384-385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 1075-1076 (semble), 
1144. The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and 
veniremen who were seated late in the process and 
therefore were subjected to some of the articles and 
broadcasts disseminated daily during the voir dire: the 
record suggests that their passions had not been inflamed 
nor their thoughts biased by the publicity. ~ App. 
176a-177a, 150a-15la; Tr. 771, 959, 1027. 
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural 
phenomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 
552, 561 (CA7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance 
should have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is 
a great healer," and public 
"subsid[ed]."), rev'd, 366 u.s. 
prejudice might 
7l,Y (1962); see 
have 
also 
Murphy, supra, at 802; Beck v. Washington, 369 u.s. 541, 
556 (1962). Not 
retained 
Si'l.lb3 ece to 
and were disqualified. But 
~~~~ 
~l-~r.e:t-_, ... :,t.J 
~z;;,_,~ .~~ ~ v.,.i-r ~.; L 
15. 
the testimony suggests that the voir dire 
select~hose who 
persuaded again. 8 
could forget or would need to be 
~·-t::.-T 
It is significant in this r~§aFd that 
Yount's counsel were relatively satisfied with the jurors 
they were getting, since they challenged for cause only 
three of the jurors and both alternates. 9 In sum, we 
think that the passage of time rebuts any presumption of 
partiality that might arise from the initial publicity in 
this case under Irvin. 
8As noted, the voir dire in this case was 
particularly extensive. It took 10 days to pick 14 jurors 
from 167 veniremen. In Irvin it took 8 days to pick 14 
jurors from 430 veniremen. 
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F.2d, at 979, 
however, the voir dire interviews quoted in the 
petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be 
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for 
Petitioner in Irvin v. Dowd, O.T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. 
It should also be noted that the voir dire in Irvin, like 
that here, was conducted largely by counsel for each side, 
rather than the judge. The only significant difference in 
the procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the 
veniremen here were brought into the courtroom alone for 
questioning, while it appears that those in Irvin were 
questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel. 
'!his is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court 
suggested in Irvin, supra, at 728, but we do not find it 
controlling. 
9 In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his 
twelve jurors for cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 u.s. 394, 398 
(1959). 
16. 
The majority~ court below thought that the fact 
that the~ ma;ority of veniremen "remembered the case" 
showed that time had not served "to erase highly 
unfavorable publicity from the memory of the community." 
710 F.2d, at 969. The court~~that the intensity of 
the original publicity and th: ~~~:O::::.t"'~he' k::, 
case firmly implanted the case in local memories. We do ;;;1 -
~s.Q -.-wi...t;:), ""'"t: Ae:!le eenclcrsie~. The relevant question 
is not whether the community ~e;b~ case J 
~JeH~a-11;-, but whether. the j~9rs 4~unt's trial . had 
~ r~~~~~ 
such fixed opinions that they co 1cf' not judgeJ\ ~ { 
on the evidence presented. Irvin, supra, at 723. l rt is 
7 not unusual that one's recollection of the fact 
I notorious crime was committed lingers long after feel in 
f{ and judgment and detailed knowledge have departed. 
/ years ordinarily is time enough. The record shows 
was here. There was fair, even abundant, support 7.or the 
.,..j..~~ 
trial court's findings that between the two {rials A. there 
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter 
through the news media," and that there had not been "any 
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a. 
lfp/ss 04/06/84 Rider A, p. 16 (Yount) 
~-------- It is not unusual that one's recollection of the · ~ 
fact that a notorious crime was committed lingers long . 
after the feelings of revulsion that create prejudice have 
passed. 
~r4 
It would be fruitless to identify any particular 
~ 
lapse of time that in itself would distinguished the 
sitaution that existed in Irvin. The passage of time 
between a first and a second trial can be a highly 
relevant fact. In the circumstances of this case, we hold 
that it clearly rebuts any presumption of partiality or 
prejudice that existed at the time of the initial trial. 
17. 
III 
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as 
the two alternates, were erroneously seated over his 
challenges for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is 
substantial doubt whether Yount properly raised in his 
petition for habeas corpus the claim that the trial court 
erroneously denied his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. 
Compare 710 F.2d, at 966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 
4 (Garth, J., concurring). And there is no evidence that 
the alternate jurors, who did not sit in judgment, 
actually talked with the other jurors during the four-day 
Jezu; : ..... c... 
trial. But Judge Garth in the court below based his 
concurrence on the view 
Yount to produce evidence 
that Hrin would have required 
~h-e~·~,..~ -4J 
to overcome his e~i~i ogpth~Athe  
;{X.... /I~ 
accused was guilty, and the majority ,.. below thought that 
the sustained association between the alternates and the 
other jurors "operate [d] to subvert the requirement that 
the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from the 
witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we . 






~ disqualify them is 
See 710 F. 2d, at 968, 
a mixed quest ion of law and fact· 
L.r~ 
n. 29, 981. Thus, ~ concluded 
1\ 
that the presumption of correctness = } .4-at_ due ~ a state court's factual findings r-.4- 28 u.s.c. §2254(d) did not apply. 
'!he opinions 
Dowd, supra, 
below relied for this proposition on Irvin v. 
c::l.4' ~/.d. ~J ~-~-~~ 
at 723. ~oasQ decided four years before the ,., 
relevant language was added to the federal habeas corpus 
of what we have said in Part II supra, 
not consider whether the language of Irvin is in 
need of amendment when it is applied, as in Irvin, to a 
determination of the p~rtiality of the jury as a whole. 1 
But we are certain that it can not be extended to a habea 
corpus case in which the partiality of an individual jure 
is placed in issue. The question then is plainly one o 
historical fact: did a juror swear that he could set aside 
10 It may be that the result under Irvin would be no 
different than under §2254 (d). In · Irvin, the Court held 
that the trial court's findings on whether a juror could 
lay aside his opinion "'ought not be set aside by a 
reviewing court, unless the error is manifest.'" 366 
u.s., at 723 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 u.s. 
145, 156 (1879)). It may be that there is little 
practical difference between the "manifest error" standard 
of Irvin and the "fairly supported by the record" standard 
of 2 8 u. S • c . § 12 54 ( d ) ( 8) • 
lfp/ss 04/06/84 Rider A, p. 18 (Yount) 
In view of what we have said in Part II, supra, we need 
not consider whether the amendment of §2254(d), if it had 
.been in effect at the time, would have required a 
P. 10. But we are convinced that where 
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue 
in a federal habeas corpus case, the question is not one 
of mixed law and fact. Rather, it is plainly one of 
19. 
any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the 
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of 
~partiality have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain, 
u.s. __ (slip op. at 6) (1983) (state court 
determination that jury's deliberations were not biased by 
ex parte communications is a finding of fact). 11 
There are good reasons to apply the statutory 
presumption of correctness to the trial court's resolution 
of these questions. First, the determination has been 
nade only after an often extended voir dire proceeding 
. . . L~ ... ~b' d . It . designed spec1f1cally to weee suf~ laSe veniremen. lS 
fair to assume that the method we have relied on since the 
beginning, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.), usually works. 12 
11There are, of course, factual and legal questions 
to be considered in deciding whether a juror is qualified. 
The constitutional standard that a juror is impartial only 
if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict based 
on the evidence presented in court is a question of 
federal law, see Irvin, supra, at 723: whether a juror can 
in fact do that is a determination to which habeas courts 
owe special deference. Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, supra, 
at __ (849) (similar analysis as to whether a guilty plea 
was voluntary) • See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 
u.s. 145, 156 (1879). 
Footnote(s) 12 will appear on following pages. 
20. 
Second, the determination is essentially one of 
~411l ....., .~~ ~ 
credibility, and therefore ofdek anor. As we have said 
1\ 
on numerous occasions, the trial court's resolution of 
such questions is entitled, even on direct appeal, to 
"special deference." E.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union 
of u.s., Inc., __ u.s. --I __ (1984) (slip op. at 14). 
~.· /e:L•'4c.~ 
The respect paid such findings in a habeas proceeding4 can 
be no less. See Marshall v. Lonberger, u.s. 
_/ --
(103 s.ct. 843, 851) (1983). 13 
12Accord In re Application of National Broadcasting 
~, 653 F.2d 609, 617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long 
been recognized as an effective method of rooting out such 
bias, especially when conducted in a careful and 
thoroughgoing manner."); United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 
839, 865 (CA4), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 871 (1979); Calley 
v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184, 209, n. 45 (CAS 197 5) (en bane) 
(citing cases), cert. denied, 425 u.s. 911 (1976) . ...... ,._,~ 
A sensitively conducted voir dire 1• almo.&t aJ.wars..('~ 
adequate to uncover juror bias caused by pretrial ~ 
publicity. Cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 u.s. 209, 222, and 
n. * ( 1982) (0 'CONNOR, J. , concurring) (describing 
situations in which state procedures are inadequate to 
uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 u.s. 723 (1963) 
(same). 
13 In addition to the fact that a large part of 
determining whether a jury is biased depends on 
credibility, demeanor plays a fundamental role in simply 
understanding what a potential juror is saying. Any 
complicated voir dire calls upon laymen to think and 
express themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of 
any transcript of such a proceeding wi 11 reveal. The 
Footnote continued on next page. 
lfp/ss 04/06/84 Rider A, p.21 (Yount) 
YOUNT21 SALLY-POW 
This is not unusually on voir dire examination, 
particularly in a highly publicized criminal case. It is 
well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may 
never have been subjected to the experience of the type of 
leading questions and cross examination tactics that 
frequently are routine, and that were eviden~ in this 
case. Unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have no 
~ 
briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand# the 
~ 
education and experience of jurors representing a cross 
• 
section of the community vary widely, and ~t be 
h 
expected invariably to express themselves carefully or 
even consistently. Every trial judge understands this, 
and under our system it is the ~1 judge who is best 
~ew of the demeanor of 
persistency and type of examination by counse~ --4:fle 
~~~~ 
competency to ser~~ iffip«rtlally. 
The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was 
P~~:~scrutiniz~as he was a member of the jury 
~ ~ ~. Lb,,..*-f-c..d... 
that convicted the defendant. We think that the trial 
'\ 
2. 
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in 
his testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the 
challenge for cause. Defense counsel sought and obtained 
permission to resume cross examination. In response to a 
question whether Hrin could set his 
21. 
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in 
the record for the state courts' conclusion that the 
jurors here would be impartial. See 28 u.s.c. §2254(d). 
tRe cali.e of each of the&e- three i\ jurors the testimony 
ambiguous and at times contradictory. 6n the othe 
~~~=-~~~~~~--~~ 
jurors appear to have been subjected to leadin 
questions and cross-examination tactics designed 
~Ld't~ 
dislodge casually held views. That &Rey gav~a variety o 
answers is not surprising, given that they were unprepare 
discuss the topic and had not, as witnesses often have, 
jurors are asked whether they have formed an "opinion" on 
a subject; on what basis it was formed; how fixed it is; 
and, most important, what the effect of it would be on 
their ability to judge a proceeding of which they have 
only the vaguest understanding. See generally Irvin v. 
Dowd, 366 u.s., at 722-723. They will often be confused 
about what information is being sought, and how to find 
and articulate it. Moreover, they may be required swiftly 
to understand and apply legal standards and presumptions 
that are new to them--such as the presumption of 
innocence, or the rule that a defendant may not be 
penalized for exercise of his right not to testify. The 
result often is a record rife with awkward utterances that 
can appear in print to be contradictory or to have 
meanings or legal nuances not intended. Dealing with such 
a record at the appellate or habeas level requires unusual 
sensitivity to the role of the trial judge. Demeanor, 
inflection, the flow of the conversation can speak 
volumes, and it may be that only those present can fully 
understand what the juror means. 
22. 
thought their "stories" through. In addition, they appear 
to have seen little reason to choose their words carefully 
and ensure that their remarks were consistent. See also 
note 13 supra. The trial judge properly chose to believe 
the statements that were the most fully articulated or 
that appeared to have been least influenced by leading. j 
In the case of juror Hrin, the judge's understanding 
of the ambiguous testimony appears to have been confirmed 
after he denied the challenge for cause. In answer to 
defense counsel's question whether Hr in could set his 
~op1nion aside before entering the jury box or would ~:{;"' t 
evidence to change his mind, the juror clearly and 
forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it [the jury 
box] with a very open mind. I think I could very easily. 
To say this is a requirement for some of the things you 
t:Jt~~~-t~~ 
have to do every day." App. 89a • ...\ )(efense counsel did not ~ 
renew their challenge for cause. Similarly, in the case 
of alternate juror Pyott, we cannot fault the trial judge 
for crediting her earliest testimony, in which she said 
that she could put her opinion aside "if [she] had to," 
rather than the later testimony in which defense counsel 
persuaded her that logically she would need evidence to 




AAfllror Chincharick's testimony is 
~ 
bQc~~ he appears to have answered 
the most ambiguous, 
L t ~ 
"yes" to almost any~ 
question put to him. It is here that the federal court's 
deference must operate, for while the cold record arouses 
some concern, only the trial judge could tell which of 
these answers was said with the greatest comprehension and 
certainty. 
IV 
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the 
record of publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of 
public passion" that would have made a fair trial 
impossible ~fo~~the jury as a whole that was empanelled. 
""" We also conclude that the ambiguity in the testimony of 
the cited jurors who were challenged for cause is 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness 
owed to the trial court's findings. We therefore reverse. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or 




TO: Joe DATE: April 6, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-95 Patton v. Yount 
I commend you on an excellent draft opinion. 
My editing, including the several riders, does 
not significantly change your analysis. It is important, 
I think, not to rest the case entirely on the four year 
interval. Our opinion should be written in a way that 
affords guidance in cases where there have not been second 
trials. 
I have read Murphy v. Florida, and think it 
merits a footnote. As pointed out particularly on pages 
795-796 of the opinion, it is not easy to think of any 
more pervasive and damaging publicity than what preceded 
~e trial of "Murph the Surf". The principal distinction, 
as we have agreed, is that a much smaller percentage of 
the original panel was excused, and ~mbers of the jury 
~ ~~e.~ .:::ac.c.-44• 4fi""S. • 
that were collected apparently were less ambiguous. But 
t1 
see WJB's dissent. 
You will not be surprised to have me say that I 
wish the draft were no so long. I have not identified any 
f 
2. 
specific part that should be omitted. In reworking the 
draft, bear in mind the desirability of eliminating 
marginal language - particularly in the footnotes. For 
example, what you have said in footnote 13 is true. It is 
marginal, however, and either should be substantially 





... , . 
.. , " 
jen 04/07/84 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
~~~~ From: Joe Re: 83-95 Patton v. Yount 
Here is a second draft of the opinion in this case. I have 
made one significant substantive change (p. 16-17) and a number 
of stylistic and condensing revisions. 
Pp. 1-8--I have considerably shortened the discussion of the 
facts. The primary changes are ( 1) I deleted, as you suggested, 
the detailed description of Yount's appearance at the police sta-
tion (pp. 1-2--I also added a new sentence about the police re-
fusal to divulge the confession), and (2) I condensed the de-
scription of the Court of Appeals decision (pp. 5-7). 
P. 9, ~ 1--I edited your rider slightly. 
P. 11, .n. 7--In addition to movil'!9 into a note the extended quo-
tation of juror Karetski 's testimOny (as ' you suggested}, I have 
cut it s~stant ~ally. I did so wit? some misgivings, ~owev~r, 
since the deleted part of the quotat1on supports our bas1c po1nt 
that the publicity and public 1nterest were minimal at the time 
of the second trial. The first draft of the opinion with the 
full quote on p. 13 is attached so you can compare the two. 
P. 12, n. 8--This note is also new. q ~ 
P. 13, ,f 1--At the end of the carryover paragraph I had a 
tence that "the passage of time rebuts any presumption of 
tiality." This statement of the holding now is repeated on 




P. 13, ~ 2--This paragraph previously began, "The majority opin-
ion below thought ••• " I altered it b~cause opiniop~ csm 't think_.... 1 L 
~ ~ A!/1-Pf.~ ~~~r·~ ~~ .. 
P. 14, 1. 2--Can we delete the word "vividly"? It seems to cut 
the wrong way for us. Hew aee~::It' ~~e"~JebeaEil-2 
P. 14, n. 11--Here is the new footnote on Murphy.~~~~ 
Pp. 16-17 & n. 12--In addition to some stylistic editing, I have 
deleted all reference to the amendment of §2254 in 1966. I have 
given the question some more thought, and done some more research 
in the area. The 1966 amendments essentially codified the de-
tailed guidelines this Court provided in Townsend v. Sain, 372 
u.s. 293 (1963). See Brewer v. Williams, 430 u.s. 387, 395 
(1977). Townsend of course also came after Irvin, but it does 
not appear to have changed prior law on how one tells whether a 






deference to state court determinatio s of factual findings. 
These appear to have been embedded in the law since at least 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 11 that the 1966 amend- tJ1<) 
ments might be said to have done is to n ve clarified and empha-
sized a preexisting doctrine. In short, it seems unlikely that 
the Court could rely on those amendments o abandon Irvin's view 
iliat federal courts independently examine ir dire testimony. 
~ · Nevertheless, I still think that CA3~6¥~~~~~ ~wrong 1n 
not defering to the trial court's finding that the jury as a 
whole was impartial. I think the best way to make this point is 
to suggest that CA3 may have misinterpreted Irvin. CA3 largely 
ignored the language in Irvin about the 'manifest error" standard 
of review. 366 u.s., at 723. While it fs true,~ believe, that 
the Court in Irvin does not mention that standard again in dis-
cussing the facts of the case before it, it plainly stated that 
the trial court's determination as to whether firm opinions could 
be set aside were to be reviewed under that standard. At any 
rate, the basic thrust of footnote 12 in this draft is to suggest 
that the federal courts give aeference to all state cou"~-rnd-
impartla 1 ty, se 1rect:e at a particular 
o no hold this at this point, however, primarily 
b=cause I am not sure that the "group bias" question should be 
termed a question of fact. ;Jt.c:;.-y-~ J, ~ 1..T t.••~ ~~-£-~ 
a.... k,..,U& ~ 
If you disagree with the above and wls~ ~- have some refer-
ence to the 1966 amendments, I have suggested in the a~~~he9 
rider language to add to the beginning of note 12. ~ ~ ~J 
~-~- ~n.u,. ?LI) k... 
P. 17, n. 13--I have added a parenthetical to the Reynolds cite. ~ 
P. 18, n. 14--In the first draft we had the following sentence 
preceding the cite to Phillips: "A sensitively conducted voir 
dire should be adequate to uncover juror bias caused by pretrial 
publicity." I deleted the sentence because I think it merely 
repeated what was already said in text. In addition, I made the 
signal "But cf." instead of "Cf." 







Fp. 19-20--In addition to stylistic editing and some rearrange-
- / ment of sentences, I added the final sentence of the carryover 
· ~ paragraph. Also, I have done some stylistic editing of the first 
sentence of the following paragraph. 
/ 
Insert to ote 12--Patton v. Yount 
Irvin w s decided five years before the relevant 
language was added to the federal habeas corpus statute, 
see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105, and before this Court's 
opinion in T wnsend v. Sain, 372 u.s. 293 (1963), provided 
the guideli s that were later codified. In view of what 
we have said in Part II, su we RQQQ ROt consider 
whether the ~~ develoP- t of t e law of habeas corpus 
would have r quired a di erent result in Irvin. 
4/ ~ ~ 4U>f .;jz__..~~ ~ 
~~~~~ 
lA.{_ 9 ~ by-
jen 04/11/84 
From: Joe 
r- ~a¥-( -A~. 
sl4ff--U~ tYf ~·-~ 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL d.•'"<. ~J;;;_.(... 
Re: No. -83-95 Patton v. Yount 
Cammie has now cite-checked this opinion, and David and Rob 
have had a look at it. Aside from minor stylistic or 
citechecking alterations, the changes are as follows: 
P. 1--David thought the marked sentence was somewhat gruesome and ~ 
irrelevant. I included it only to suggest why it might have been ~ 
that the authorities lodged a charge of rape. Perhaps David is 
right. 
Pp. 5-6-~ob suggested that we emphasize the "manifest error" 
standard of review here, briefly describe Irvin, and clearly 
state our holding. Cammie likewise suggested that footnote 12, 
which in essence discusses the standard of review to be used in 
part II, seemed out of place at the beginning of part III. Fi-
nally, David suggested that instead of merely distinguishing 
Irvin we suggest that the Court of Appeals applied that case too 
mechanistically--rather than look at the totality of the circum-
stances, it looked only to the three factors considered at length 
in Irvin. These suggestions seem sound to me. I propose that 
the beginning of this paragraph be rewritten as follows: 
INSERT "A" 
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision 
that the jury was not impartial on this Court's deci-
sion in Irvin v. Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading 
one at the time, held that adverse pretrial publicity 
can create such a presumption of prejudice in a commu-
nity that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial 
should not be believed. The Court in Irvin reviewed a 
number of factors in determining whether the totality 
of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The 
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings 
of impartiality might 
error." 366 u.s., at 
page 2. 
be overturned only for "manifest ...J.. 
dA.d., ~ ~ ~,. '--t-
723. The Court of Appeals.t\ ~ 
~ this aspect of the Irvin decision. 7 Moreover, 
the court below, in concentrating on the factors dis-
cussed at length in Irvin, failed to give adequate 
weight to other significant circumstances in this case. 
In Irvin, the Court noted that it was during the six or ., -
seven months •.•• 
The next three sentences would be as they appear in the cur-
rent chambers draft (they have been somewhat rewritten for style 
and clarity). Then the following sentence would be inserted: 
INSERT "B" 
In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court 
did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury 
as a whole was impartial. 
The current footnote 12 would be moved to here, rewritten as 
follows: 
INSERT "C" 
7The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that 
two statements in Irvin--that a federal court must "in-
dependently evaluate" the voir dire testimony, and that 
the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of 
law and fact, 366 u.s., at 723--meant that there is no 
presumption of correctness owed to the trial court's 
finding that a jury as a whole is impartial. We note 
that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added 
to the habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of 
correctness for state court factual findings, see Pub. 
L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years before 
this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 u.s. 293 
(1963) , provided the guidelines that were later codi-
fied. It may be that there is little practical differ-
ence between the Irvin "manifest error" standard and 
the "fairly supported by the record" standard of the 
amended habeas statute. See 28 u.s.c. §2254(d). In 
any case, we do not think the habeas standard is any 
less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's 





standard, we do not need to determine whether the sub-
sequent development of the law of habeas corpus might 
have required a different analysis or result in that 
case~ 
Pp. 8-9--I wonder how persuasive the point made in the carryover~~ 
sentence is. Cammie pointed out that Yount's counsel evidently ~ 
were not satisfied, oecause they continued to seek changes of 
venue during and after voir dire. 
P. 9, ,I 2--The second sentence of this paragraph used to read, 
"The court noted that the intensity of the original publicity and 
the subsequent references to the case firmly implanted it in 
local memories." Cammie tho~_9ht this was repetitious, and I 
agreed. I have deleted it. t)f\ 
In the seventh sentence of this paragraph I had the printer 
set a version that Cammie suggested. In view of the changes I lf7; 
suggest on pages 5-6 above, I think the original language was ....,./~ 
better, so I have written back in what we had before. 
' . 
1st DRAFT 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 






From: Justice Powell 
APR 12 1984 Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-95 
ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP 
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v. 
JON E. YOUNT 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[April - , 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so 
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his 
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury." 
I 
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-year-
old high school student, was found in a wooded area near her 
home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. 
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her 
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of stran-
gulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her 
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been 
sexually assaulted. 
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent 
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby Du-
Bois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school math-
ematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written 
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the 
confession to the press, and it was not published until after it 
was read at Yount's arraignment three days later. Ex. 
P1-a, P1-d. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admit-
ted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree mur-
der and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deter-
mined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), 
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an 
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a 
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d 
464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970). 
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered 
suppression of Yount's written confessions and that portion 
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally 
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge. 
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart 
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and 
took ten days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1186 
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue be-
fore, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued 
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information 
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors, 
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numer-
ous newspaper and other articles about the case. The mo-
tions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles 
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the 
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's le-
niency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors; 
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or 
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any, 
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also ob-
served that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely 
attended. 
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated. 
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not 
claim temporary insanity. Instead . he relied upon cross-
examination and character witnesses in an attempt to under-
mine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him 
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life 
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new 
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to 
the case between the two trials, and that little public interest 
was shown during the second trial. In addition, the court 
concluded that the jury was without bias. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affii.nled the conviction and the trial court's 
findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, 311-314, 
314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974). 
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter 
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who 
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be 
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's rec-
ommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (W. D. Pa. 1982). It held 
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor offi-
cially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside 
any preconceived notions of guilt. It noted that the percent-
age of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to any-
one familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in 
Pennsylvania." I d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed 
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a chal-
lenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the 
jury was impartial. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710 
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis 
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that 
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in 
Clearfield County. It independently examined the nature of 
the publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at 
voir dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony 
of the jurors eventually seated. The publicity revealed 
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his 
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted 
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two 
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it, 
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion 
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in 
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for 
cause becaus~ they had fixed opinions concerning the peti-
tioner's guilt. FinallY, the Court of Appeals found that eight 
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted 
that they at some time had formed an opinion as to Yount's 
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given 
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside 
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both al-
ternates would have required evidence to overcome their be-
liefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of 
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and 
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented." 
710 F. 2d, at 972. • 
'The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the 
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the 
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F. 2d, at 969, n. 21. 
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after 
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record 
considered by the trial court. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that 
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined 
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case, 
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. I d. , at 969, n. 22. The court 
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spec-
tators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising 
from the "'circus atmosphere' " in the courtroom. Ibid. 
2 One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused 
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed 
for cause before they were questioned on the case. 
a The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had 
formed opinions of guilt. 
•Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested 
that "the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the lower 
courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than hinge 
disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt that he 
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Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to 
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the 
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the an-
swers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He 
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voir dire 
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a commu-
nity saturated with puolicity adverse to the defendant." /d., 
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his 
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have re-
quired evidence to change his mind about Yount's guilt. 
This stripped the defendant of the presumption of 
innocence. 6 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1983), to consider, 
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media 
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensa-
tional criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
II 
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the 
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v. 
cannot lay aside, Judge Stern would bar any juror who admitted any opin-
ion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where more than 
25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning the de-
fendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of those 
who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stern wrote. 
6 Judge Garth thought Irvin was distinguishable, because there ''the 
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not 
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979. 
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could 
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge 
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual 
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for 
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959). 
•Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally bi-
ased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981. 
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is appli-
cable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). 
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Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading one at the time, held 
that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption 
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they 
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in Irvin 
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the to-
tality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The 
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of 
impartiality might be overturned only for "manifest error." 
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals did not address this 
aspect of the Irvin decision. 7 Moreover, the court below, in 
concentrating on the factors discussed at length in Irvin, 
failed to give adequate weight to other significant circum-
stances in this case. In Irvin, the Court observed that it 
was during the six or seven months immediately preceding 
trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, car-
toons and pictures was unleashed against [the defendant]." 
366 U. S., at 725: In this case, the extensive adverse public-
ity and the community's sense of outrage were at their height 
prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury selection for 
Yount's second trial, at issue here, did not occur until four 
years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity was greatly 
7 The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in 
/rtrin--that a federal court must "independently evaluate" the voir dire 
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of 
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 723-meant that there is no presumption of cor-
rectness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial. 
We note that Irtrin was decided five years before Congress added to the 
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court 
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years be-
fore this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), pro-
vided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little 
practical difference between the Irtrin ''manifest error" standard and the 
''fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute. 
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas stand-
ard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this 
case under Irtrin's ''manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine 
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might 
have required a different analysis or result in that case. 
·' 
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diminished and community sentiment had softened. In 
these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not com-
mit manifest error in finding that the jury as a whole was 
impartial. 
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the re-
versal of the first conviction to .the start of the second voir 
dire each of the two ·etearfield County daily newspapers pub-
lished an average of less than one article per month. App. 
642a--657a; Ex. P1-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many 
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial 
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspa-
pers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the 
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse public-
ity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial. 
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829, 
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers 
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were 
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or 
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selec-
tion. App. 658a--671a. In short, the record of publicity in 
the months preceding, and at the time of, the second trial 
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity imme-
diately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798 
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion," 
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin. 
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had 
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on 
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen, 
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their 
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33,284, 541-544, 991. In addi-
tion, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen 
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many, 
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had 
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror 
number 8); Tr. 384--385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 
·' 
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1075-1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10).8 
The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and venire-
men who were seated late in the process and therefore were 
subjected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated 
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their 
passions had not be~n_inflamed nor their thoughts biased by 
8 The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during exami-
nation by defense counsel is illustrative: 
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years? 
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it. 
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I 
presume? 
"A. What I have read in the paper again. 
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it? 
"A. Not too many so far. 
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it? 
"A. Not too many of those so far too. 
"Q. Back around '66, did you? 
"A. Yes in '66. 
! "Q. . .. I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or inno-
cence [in 1966]? 
"A. I had an opinion yes. 
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence? 
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper 
he plead [sic] not guilty. 
"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you 
wipe it out of your mind-erase it out of your mind before you would take a 
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear? 
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I 
probably did but right now I don't. 
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate 
that opinion if you can tell me? 
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about 
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a. 
• Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen. 
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771, 
959, 1027. 
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phe-
nomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552, 
561 (CA7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should 
have been granted be_gause "[t]he passage of time is a great 
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."), 
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802; 
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all 
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the 
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and 
were disqualified. But. the testimony suggests that the voir 
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would 
need to be persuaded again. 10 
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the 
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed 
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable public-
ity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969. 
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The 
relevant question is not whether the community remembered 
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such 
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt 
of the defendant. Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual 
10 As noted, the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took 
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In Irvin it took 8 days to 
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen. 
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F. 2d, at 979, however, the voir 
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be 
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in 
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that 
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for 
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the 
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were 
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that 
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel. 
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin, 
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling. 
.. 
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that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was 
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that 
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to at-
tempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself 
would distinguish the situation that existed in lrvin. 11 But it 
is clear that the passage of time between a first and a second 
trial can be a highly . relevant fact. In the circumstances of 
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of 
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial 
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial 
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there 
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter 
through the news media," and that there had not been "any 
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a. 
III 
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the 
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges 
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial 
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for ha-
beas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied 
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at 
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring). 
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did 
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors dur-
ing the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below 
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have re-
quired Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination 
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel 
11 In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely 
known as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of dam-
aging publicity preceding his trial was at least as extreme as that in this 
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin. 
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy 
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. I d., 
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first 
trial; there was no second trial in that case. 
.. 
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates 
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement 
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from 
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will 
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors. 
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that 
the question wheth'er jurors have opinions that disqualify 
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at 
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption 
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied 
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin 
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a ques-
tion we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analy-
sis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which 
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That 
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is 
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could 
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the 
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality 
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain,-- U.S.--, 
-- (1983) (state court determination that jury's delibera-
tions were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding 
of fact). 12 
There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption 
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these ques-
12 There are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in de-
ciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a ju-
ror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see 
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a determination 
to which habeas courts owe special deference. Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 
459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis as to whether a guilty plea 
was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 156 
(1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a question involving both a 
legal standard and findings of fact, which may be set aside only for mani-
fest error). 
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tions. First, the determmation has been made only after an 
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to 
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the 
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C. C. D. Va. 1807) (Mar-
shall, C. J.), usually works. 13 Second, the determination is 
essentially one of credibility, and therefore largely one of de-
meanor. As we have said on numerous occasions, the trial 
court's resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct 
appeal, to "special deference." E. g., Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of U. S., Inc., -- U. S. --, -- (1984). 
The respect paid such findings in a habeas proceeding cer-
tainly can be no less. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 
422, 434435 (1983). 14 
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the 
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here 
would be impartial. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(8). The testi-
mony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and 
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire 
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case. 
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may 
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions 
11 Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609, 
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective 
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and 
thoroughgoing manner."); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865 
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982) 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state proce-
dures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 
(1963) (same). 
•• Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credi-
bility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying. 
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express 
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a 
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions 
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible. 
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and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed, 
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors rep-
resent a cross-section of the community, and their education 
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, pro-
spective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to tak-
ing the stand. Juror~ thus cannot be expected invariably to 
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every 
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that 
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve 
impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe 
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that 
appeared to have been least influenced by leading. 
The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scru-
tinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as 
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury 
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial 
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in his 
testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the chal-
lenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission to 
resume cross-examination. In response to a question 
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the 
jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the ju-
ror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it 
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very 
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things 
you have to do every day." App. 89a. Mter this categori-
cal answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for 
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we 
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testi-
mony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside 
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which 
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need 
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a, 
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the 
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered 
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the 
· I 
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federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold 
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell 
which of these answers was said with the greatest compre-
hension and certainty. 
IV 
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of 
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion" 
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that 
was empanelled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambi-
guity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were chal-
lenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption 
of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We there-
fore reverse. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
.invrttttt <!fond ttf t4t 'Juittb .italt.s' 
'Jht,glfington, ~. <If. 2ll~~~ 
' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
April 16, 1984 
No. 83-95 Patton v. Yount 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
~u.p:rtutt <!J4turt d Urt ~b ~ta;tes 
._ulfinghnt, ~. <q. 2ll~,.~ 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
April 17, 1984 
Re: No. 83-95 Patton v. Yount 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.Ju:prtmt <!Jl1'1tri ltf tlrt 'Jnit~ .§taft$' 
'Jraglfinghnt. ~. OJ. Zllbi~~ 
JUSTI C E BY RO N R . W HIT E 
April 19, 1984 
Re: 83-95 - Patton v. Yount 
Dear Lewis, 
Although I would rather not take these 
fact-bound cases for plenary consideration 
and voted to affirm at conference, I can go 






Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JO H N PAUL S T EVENS 
;iu:puuu <!J~url ~f tlft ~nif:t~ ;ibrlt.s' 
'Jl•lfingt~n. ~. <!J. 2ll&f,.$ 
April 19, 1984 
Re: 83-95 - Patton v. Yount 
Dear Lewis: 
Like Byron, I think we are unwise to take these 
fact-bound cases. Having taken it, however, I remain 
persuaded that the Third Circuit has the better of the 
argument and therefore plan to write a brief dissent as 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tutt ar~t llf tltt ~ttittb ~ta.tts 
._,asJri:ttghm. ~. <If. 2ll,;t,.,;t 
Re: No. 83-95 - Patton v. Yount 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
April 20, 1984 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
J;ttpt"tut~ ~onrt.of t4~ ~a J;nmg 
•ulfinghtn. ~. ~· 2ll&f~$ 
May 16, 1984 





Copies to the Conference 
I 









From: Justice Stevens 
JVN 18 1984 Circulated: _______ _ 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-95 
ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP 
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v. 
JON E. YOUNT 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1984] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
On page 1 of its opinion the Court carefully states certain 
facts that give the reader a strong feeling about how this case 
should be decided. In 1966, Jon Yount confessed that he 
was responsible for the brutal killing of an 18-year-old high-
school student. At his first trial in 1966 he testified that he 
had been temporarily insane at the time, but the jury did not 
believe him. He was found guilty of rape, as well as murder. 
These facts were not admissible in evidence at his ond 
trial. at 1mpact, 1 any, 1 ese ma m1ss1 le acts have 
upon 12 jurors, the 2 alternate jurors, and indeed the trial 
judge, who listened to the evidence at Yount's second trial in 
1970? The Court is satisfied that "community sentiment had 
softened," ante, at 7, and that the trial judge "did not commit 
manifest error in finding that the jury as a whole was impar-
tial," ante, at 7, because of the passage oftime between 1966 
and 1970, and because we all know that "time soothes and 
erases," ante, at 9. 
In order to explain why I disagree with the Court's assess-
ment of the case, it is necessary to enlarge upon its summary 
of the news coverage of the crime and its aftermath, to sup-
plement its discussion of the examination of the jurors, and to 
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explain why the Court of Appeals properly rejected the trial 
judge's conclusion that the jury as a whole was impartial. 
Next, I will discuss my disagreement with the Court's con-
clusion regarding Juror Hrin. Finally, I shall add a word 
about the more profound issue that a case of this kind raises. 
I 
Because the Court places such great emphasis on the fact 
that "this lapse in time had a profound effect on the commu-
nity and, more important, on the jury, in softening or effac-
ing opinion," ante, at 7, it is important to note that there 
were, in effect, three chapters in the relevant news coverage: 
the stories about the crime itself and t e first trial in 
1966; the stories and events surrounding the State Supreme 
Court's reversal of the first conviction in 1969; and the stories 
that were published in 1970 immediately before the trial be-
gan and while the jury was being selected. 
The relevant events all occurred in Clearfield County, 
Pennsylvania, where both Yount and the victim lived. It is 
a rural county, with a population of about 70,000, served by 
two newspapers with a combined circulation of about 25,000. 
Not surprisingly, both newspapers gave front-page coverage 
to the homicide, the pretrial proceedings and the trial itself. 
In numerous editions of the DuBois Courier Express, the 
newspaper carried banner headlines on the front page, news 
stories and feature articles. App. 520a-641a; Ex. Pl-a, 
Pl-b, Pl-d, Pl-f to Pl-t. The Clea eld Progess evaluated 
the trial as the o news story of 1966. Ex. P-2. Both 
papers reported t at public in ere m the proceedings was 
"unprecedented." Yount v. Patton, 710 F. 2d 956, 962 (CA3 
1983). Moreover, the case also received radio and television 
coverage, see, e. g., Tr. 64 (juror number 1), 142, 220, 277, 
and, according to the Court of Appeals, was publicized in out-
of-state and national publications. 710 F. 2d, at 962, n. 6. 
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The articles were extremely detailed. 1 As the Court of 
Appeals noted, they "related in full [Yount's] detailed written 
confessions as well as his testimony at trial retelling the ho-
micide. They also detailed [Yount's] defense of temporary 
insanity, the charge and evidence of rape, and finally 
[Yount's] conviction on October 7, 1966, of both rape and 
first-degree murder." Id., at 963; see, e. g., App. 538a-
540a, 603a-606a. As this Court notes, "[T]he extensive ad-
verse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at 
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966," ante, at 6. 
In 1969, a divided Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re-
versed Yount's conviction and ordered a new trial. Com-
monwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d 464 (1969), cert. 
denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970). This event did not pass unno-
ticed in Clearfield County. To the contrary, banner head-
lines announced the reversal. App. 642a; Ex. Pl-v. The 
local press reprinted the entire dissenting opinion. App. 
644a; Ex. Pl-x. And, as the Court of Appeals stated, "[A] 
local radio program became a forum in which callers ex-
pressed their hostility to [Yount]." 710 F. 2d, at 963. This 
evidence contradicts the easy assumption that "community 
sentiment had softened," ante, at 7. 
In 1970, Yount was returned to Clearfield County for are-
trial in the same courtroom before the same judge who had 
presided at the first trial-the judge whose erroneous rulings 
had made the second trial necessary. Yount moved for a 
change of venue on the ground that the continuing discussion 
1 The "details" of the articles prompted two citizens to write letters to 
the Courier Express. One letter complained that the paper had "fanned 
the already poisoned atmosphere of malicious gossip" by putting a picture 
of the corpse on the front page and by the "repetitive use of gory details." 
The author added that he thought he "was looking at the National 
Enquirer." The second letter noted that "[e]motional editorializing most 
certainly has it's [sic] place in reporting, but I strenuously object to such 
when it appears in headline stories . . . . [D]escriptive words that do much 
to sell newspapers and stir emotions discredit headline reporting and tend 
to prejudice the suspect regardless of degree of guilt." Ex. Pl-€. 
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of the case among local residents made it impossible for him 
to receive a fair trial in Clearfield County. In response the 
prosecutor argued that a change of venue would be pointless 
because the case had been so widely publicized throughout 
the State. The trial court denied the motion, explaining that 
the recent newspaper items had consisted of purely factual 
reporting "without editorial comment of any kind." App. 
260a. This venue ruling generated a front-page article. 
App. 654a; Ex. Pl-gg. Additionally, during the subsequent 
voir dire, the selection of jurors merited numerous articles 
and sometimes merited a profile on the juror selected. App. 
658a-659a, 661a-663a, 664a-671a; Ex. Pl-ll, Pl-nn to Pl-vv; 
P-2. 
The voir dire testimony of one prospective juror, the wife 
of a minister, sheds a revelatory light on the character of 
local sentiment on the eve of the second trial. After 
acknowledging that she had heard many opinions about the 
case, she was asked: 
"Q. Would your presence in serving as a juror create a 
difficulty in your parish? 
"A. Why yes-when people heard my name on for 
this-countless people of the church have come to me 
and said they hoped I would take-the stand I would 
take in case I was called. I have had a prejudice built 
up from the people in the church. 
"Q. Is this prejudice, had it been adverse to Mr. 
Yount? 
"A. Yes it was. They all say he had a fair trial and he 
got a fair sentence. He's lucky he didn't get the chair. 
[T]he church people-! haven't asked for any of this 
but they discuss it in every group-but they say now 
since you are chosen and you will be there we expect you 
to follow through-
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"Q. Notwithstanding what the Court would tell you, 
you feel you be subject to the retributions or retaliation 
of these people-
"A. I think I would hear about it." App. 25a-27a. 
The minister's wife was excused. Her testimony, as well 
as that of other veniremen who were excused, not only re-
pudiates the notion that the community had all but forgotten 
the Yount case, but also suggests that some veniremen might 
have been tempted to understate their recollection of the 
case because they felt they had a duty to their neighbors "to 
follow through." 2 In all events, the record clearly estab-
lishes that the case was still a "cause celebre" in Clearfield 
County in 1970. 
II 
Even if all the voir dire testimony is accepted at face value, 
it is difficult to understand how a neutral observer could con-
dude that the jury as a whcle was impartial. Before refer-
ring to the 12-Jurors and 2 alternates who were selected, it is 
useful to describe the attitude that pervaded the entire 
venire. 
The jury selection took 10 days. App. 745a; 710 F. 2d, at 
963, 975. Out of an original total of 292 veniremen, the court 
dismissed 129 because they had been chosen improperly, Tr. 
685-686, or had a valid reason for not serving. Tr. 117-118, 
492, 1039, 1060-1061. Of the remaining 163 who were ques-
tioned, all but 2 had read or heard about the case, Tr. 
127a-128a, 370a-371a (juror number 4); all but 42 were dis-
missed for cause. 710 F. 2d, at 963. Of the 121 dismissed 
for cause, 96 testified that they had firm opinions that could 
not be changed regardless of what evidence might be pre-
sented. Twenty-one others testified that they could only 
change their opinion if Yount could convince them to do so. 
2 As the Court of Appeals pointed out, another prospective juror testi-
fied that his opinion had been erased by the passage of time, but his daugh-
ter-in-law testified that he had left for jury duty voicing great animosity 
toward Yount. 710 F. 2d, at 964; App. 766a. 
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In addition, there were 9 veniremen who were unsuccessfully 
challenged for cause who also testified that they had opinions 
that they could change only if Yount could convince them to 
do so. 3 ld., at 963-964. Thus, as Judge Hunter summa-
rized for the Court of Appeals: 
"When we combine those nine with the 117 veniremen 
dismissed for cause, we find that a total of 126 out of the 
163 veniremen questioned on the case were willing to ad-
mit on voir dire that they would carry their opinion[s] 
into the jury box." 4 I d., at 964. 
Tu~ ~ ffi~{ui.ors who were actually selected, Judge \ 
Hunter ~a~curately noted that "the publicity had reached all 
but one of the twelve jurors and two alternates finally 
empanelled." ld. (footnote omitted); App. 32a, 43a, 71a, 
83a, 98a, 120a, 149a, 163a, 176a, 193a, 210a, 235a, 250a. Ju-
ror No. 1 noted that "it was pretty hard to be here in 
Clearfield County and not read something in the paper" 
about the case; that she had read newspaper stories and lis-
tened to radio and television stories about the case; and that 
she had heard the case being discussed by other people. 
App. 32a. Juror No. 2 testified that he had read about the 
case in the newspapers; that "[y ]ou could hardly miss it on 
[radio and televison] news"; and that he had formed an opin-
ion about the case. App. 43a-44a. The person seated as Ju-
3 The Court of Appeals added: 
"Petitioner peremptorily challenged six of those nine veniremen, one was 
seated as a juror, and the remaining two were seated as alternates after 
petitioner had exhausted his peremptory challenges." 710 F. 2d, at 964, 
n. 13. 
• At this point, the Court of Appeals added the following footnote: 
"In addition, we note that twelve other veniremen stated that they had had 
an opinion at one time but claimed they would not carry it into the jury 
box. One of the twelve veniremen was dismissed for cause, six were 
peremtorily challenged by petitioner, and five were seated as jurors." 710 
F. 2d, at 964, n. 14. 
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ror No. 3 5 stated that he had read about the case in the 
newspapers years before the voir dire but that he had not 
formed an opinion. App. 210a-211a. Juror No. 4, a new-
comer to the area, had never heard of the case. App. 
57a-58a. Juror No. 5 "remembered that they said he was 
guilty before" and wondered why they were having another 
trial. App. 73a. James F. Hrin, Juror No.6, testified that 
he had an opinion about the case and that he would require 
the presentation of evidence to change it. App. 83a, 85a. 
He noted that "[i]t's rather difficult to live in DuBois and get 
the paper and find out what people are talking about-at 
least the local people without having some opinion or at least 
reserving some opinion." App. 88a. Juror No. 7 stated 
that he had read about the case; that he had formed an opin-
ion; and that he was not sure whether he still had an opinion. 
App. 98a-99a. Juror No. 8 testified that she had heard oth-
ers express opinions concerning the case and she only had an 
opinion "on just what he said himself-that he was guilty." 
App. 120a, 125a. Juror No. 9 stated that she had felt that 
petitioner was guilty but that presently she would have to 
hear both sides before forming an opinion. App. 150a. Ju-
ror No. 10 had heard people express their opinions and had 
on occasion expressed his own opinion about the case. He 
also stated that he would listen to both sides before forming a 
present opinion. App. 164a-165a. Juror No. 11 testified 
that he had read newspaper accounts of the case but that he 
had formed no opinion. App. 177a. Juror No. 12 had read 
about the case but she had formed no opinion. App. 
193a-194a. Two alternates were seated over Yount's chal-
lenges for cause. Alternate No. 1 stated that he had heard 
people express opinions and ideas about the case; that he had 
expressed an opinion; that he still had a firm and fixed opin-
ion based on what he read in the newspapers; and that he 
would require evidence to be presented before he could put 
5 The person initially selected as Juror No. 3 was not able to sit because 
of personal reasons. Tr. 1060-1061. 
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his opinion out of his mind. App. 235a-240a. Alternate No. 
2 stated that she had formed a definite opinion and that she 
would require the production of evidence to change her mind. 
App. 251a-252a. 
The totality of these circumstances convinces me that the 
trial judge committed manifest error in determining that the 
jury as a w o e was 1mpartial. The trial judge's comment 
that t ere was it e a m public about the second trial, 
App. at 264a, is plainly inconsistent with the evidence ad-
duced during the voir dire. Similarly, the trial court's state-
ment that "there was practically no publicity given to this 
matter through the news media . . . except to report that a 
new trial had been granted by the Supreme Court," App. 
268a, simply ignores at least 55 front-page articles that are in 
the record. Ex. P-1, P-2. Further, the trial judge's state-
ment that "almost all, if not all, [of the first 12] jurors ... 
had no prior or present fixed opinion," App. 264a, is mani-
festly erroneous; a review of the record reveals that 5 of the 
12 had acknowledged either a prior or a present opinion. 
App. 43a-44a; 83a; 98a-99a; 150a; 164a-165a. The trial 
judge's "practically no publicity" statement also ignores the 
first-trial details within the news stories. These included 
Yount's confessions, testimony and conviction of rape--all of 
which were outside of the evidence presented at the second 
trial. See App. 643a-644a, 650a, 655a; Ex. Pl-w, Pl-x, Pl-z, 
Pl-cc, Pl-hh. Under these circumstances, · I do not believe 
that the jury was capable of deciding the case solely on the 
evidence before it. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 217 
(1982)("[d]ue process means a jury capable and willing to de-
cide the issue solely on the evidence before it"). 
III 
The Court today also rejects Yount's claim that juror Hrin 
was erroneously seated over his challenge for cause. Before 
explaining why I disagree with this conclusion, it is necessary 
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to set forth a ore complete version of Hrin's oir dire testi-
mony than is se fo y e Court. 
Hrin, in response to the prosecution's questioning, gave 
the following testimony: 
"Q. Have you formed any opinion as to the guilt or in-
nocence of Mr. Yount? 
"A. To the degree it was written up in the papers, 
yes. 
"Q. Is this a fixed opinion on your part? 
"A. This is sort of difficult to answer. Fixed? 
"Q. Let me ask-if you were to be selected as a juror 
in this case and take the jury box, could you erase or re-
move the opinion you now hold and render a verdict 
solely on the evidence and law produced at this trial? 
"A. It is very possible. I wouldn't say for sure. 
"Q. Do you think you could? 
"A. I think I possibly could. 
"Q. Then the opin_ion you hold is not necessarily a 
fixed and immobile opinion? 
"A. I would say not, because I work at a job where I 
have to change my mind constantly. 
"Q. Would you be able to change your mind regarding 
your opinion before becoming a juror in this case. 
That's the way I must have you answer the question. 
"A. If the facts were so presented I definitely could 
change my mind. 
"Q. Would you say you could enter the jury box pre-
suming him to be innocent? 
"A. It would be rather difficult for me to answer. 
"Q. Can you enter the jury box with an open mind 
prepared to find your verdict on the evidence as pre-
sented at trial and the law presented by the Judge? 
"A. That I could do." App. 83a-84a. 
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"Q. Did I understand Mr. Hrin you would require 
some-you would require evidence or something before 
you could change your opinion you now have? 
"A. Definitely. If the facts show a difference from 
what I had originally-had been led to believe, I would 
defintely change my mind. 
"Q. But until you're shown those facts, you would not 
change your mind-is that your positon? 
"A. Well-! have nothing else to go on. 
"Q. I understand. Then the answer is yes-you 
would not change your mind until you were presented 
facts? 
"A. Right, but I would enter with an open mind. 
"Q. In other words, you're saying that while facts 
were presented you would keep an open mind and after 
that you would feel free to change your mind? 
"A. Definitely. 
"Q. But you would not change your mind until the 
facts were presented? 
"A. Right .... " App. 85a-86a. 
Yount's counsel subsequently challenged for cause; the court 
denied the challenge because Hrin "said he could go in with 
an open mind." App. 86a. 
First, even if we regard the relevant rulings as findings of 
fact, Hrin's testimony clearly is sufficient to overcome the ~ 
presumption of correctness due a state court's factual find-
ings under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). The state court's deter-
mination is not fairly supported by the record. Hrin not only 
indicated that he had a previous opinion as to Yount's guilt or 
innocence, but that he required evidence produced at trial to 
dispel that opinion. Further, he stated-pursuant to the 
prosecution's questioning-that "[i]t would be rather difficult 
... to answer" whether he could enter the jury box presum-
ing Yount's innocence. Under these circumstances, I am 
convinced that the trial court improperly impaneled Hrin. 
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More important, however, I believe the Court's analysis 
regarding whether a juror has a disqualifying opinion is 
flawed. The Court begins by stating that such a question is 
one of historical fact, ante, at 11. It then concludes, simply, 
that this factual finding is entitled to 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)'s 
presumption of correctness. Finally, it acknowledges that 
"[t]here are, of course, factual and legal questions to be con-
sidered in deciding whether a juror is qualified," ante, at 11, 
n. 12, and cites as one authority ~eynolds v. United States, 
98 u. s. 145 (1879). 6 
Contrary to the Court, I believe that whether a juror has a 
disq~on is a mixea question of law and fact. 
The prope s mg pomt o ana ys1s 1s eynolds v. United 
States, supra. In that case, the defendant excepted to the 
trial court's decision to reject several challenges for cause 
that were based on juror testimony during voir dire. I d., at 
146-147. This Court upheld the trial court's decision. Id., 
at 157. Before reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Court 
stated: 
"The theory of law is that a juror who has formed an 
opinion cannot be impartial. Every opinion which he 
may entertain need not necessarily have this effect. In 
these days of newspaper enterprise and universal educa-
tion, every case of public interest is almost, as a matter 
of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelli-
gent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be 
found among the best fitted for jurors who has not read 
or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some 
opinion in respect to the merits. It is clear, therefore, 
6 The Court also cites as authority Rushen v. Spain, - U. S. -
(1983) (per curiam), and Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422 (1983). 
Neither of those cases was correctly decided. Moreover, the latter case is 
plainly inapplicable because it involved the voluntariness of guilty pleas, 
not juror partiality. The former involved an allegation of juror partiality 
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that upon the trial of the issue of fact raised by a chal-
lenge for such cause the court will practically be called 
upon to determine whether the nature and strength of 
the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily to raise 
the presumption of partiality. The question thus pre-
sented is one of mixed law and fact, and to be tried,. as 
far as the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that 
character,li'poill:lie eViOence. The finding of the trial 
court tipon that issue ought not to be set aside bya re-
viewmg court, unless the error is manifest." I d., at 
155-156. 
I~, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), extended Reynolds to 
habeas corpus proceedings. Initially, Irvin noted that a pre-
sumption of a prospective juror's impartiality is not rebutted 
"if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and ren-
der a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." I d., 
at 723. Next, the Court affirmed that a proper inquiry may 
demonstrate "'whether the nature and strength of the opin-
ion formed are such as in law necessarily . . . raise the pre-
sumption of partiality,"' id. (quoting Reynolds v. United 
States, supra, at 156), and that this inquiry is "'one of mixed 
law and fact.'" Ibid. \ 
Thus, Reynolds and Irvin teach that the question whether 
a juror has an opinion that disqualifies is a mixed one of law 
and fact. Therefore, one cannot apply the presumption of 
correctness found in 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) because the statu-
tory language by definition applies only to the factual deter-
minations of state courts. Applying the proper analytical 
framework, I believe that Hrin's testimony clearly raised a 
presumption of partiality. Therefore, the trial judge com-
mitted manifest error by improperly impaneling Hrin. 7 
7 The Court states that it "does not think [Irvin's] analysis can be ex-
tended to a federal habeas corpus case in which the partiality of an individ-
ual juror is placed in issue." Ante, at 11. The validity of Irvin (habeas 
corpus case) and of Reynolds (individual jurors), and the inapplicability of 
28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), dispose of any meaningful reason not to "extend" 
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There is a special reason to require independent review in 
a case that arouses the passions of the local community in 
which an elected judge is required to preside. Unlike an ap-
pointed federal judge with life tenure, an elected judge has 
reason to be concerned about the community's reaction to his 
dispositon of highly publicized cases. Even in the federal ju-
diciary, some circuits have determined that it is sound prac-
tice to have the retrial of a case assigned to a different judge 
than the one whose erroneous ruling made another trial nec-
essary; for though the risk that a judge will subconsciously 
strive to vindicate the result reached at the first trial may be 
remote, as long as human beings preside at trials, that pos-
sibility cannot be ignored entirely. 
IV 
Two additional and somewhat disturbing questions merit 
comment: (1) why did this Court exercise its discretionary ju-
risdiction to review this case; and (2) even if the Court of Ap-
peals' analysis of the case is entirely correct, why should 
those federal judges order the great writ of habeas corpus to 
issue for the benefit of a prisoner like Yount, who, it would 
seem, is guilty of a heinous offense? 
The answer to the question why the Court grants certio-
rari in any given case usually involves considerations of both 
fact and law. It appears that the facts motivated the Court 
to select this case for plenary review. The facts that had 
such a motivating impact on this Court-that the conviction 
of a confessed murderer of a high-school student had been set 
aside by an appellate court-also, I believe, must have had an 
emotional and unforgettable impact on the residents of Clear-
field County. The desire to "follow through"-to do some-
these cases to federal-habeas-corpus cases in which the partiality of indi-
vidual jurors is placed in issue. 
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thing about such an apparent miscarriage of justice-is diffi-
cult for judges as well as laymen to resist. 8 
It should not be forgotten that Yount has already been in-
carcerated for 18 years. If, as the Court of Appeals held, he 
has not yet been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
fair trial, the possibility remains that he has already received 
a greater punishment than is warranted. Of much greater 
importance is our dedication to the principle that guilt or in-
nocence of a criminal offense in our society is not to be de-
cided by executive fiat or by popular vote. This is a princi-
ple that affords protection for every citizen in the United 
States. Justice Frankfurter stated this point in his concur-
rence in Irvin v. Dowd: 
"More than one student of society has expressed the 
view that not the least significant test of the quality of a 
civilization is it treatment of those charged with crime, 
particularly with offenses which arouse the passions of a 
community. One of the rightful boasts of Western civi-
lization is that the State has the burden of establishing 
guilt solely on the basis of evidence produced in court 
and under circumstances assuring an accused all the 
safeguards of a fair procedure. These rudimentary con-
ditions for determining guilt are inevitably wanting if the 
jury which is to sit in judgment on a fellow human being 
comes to its task with its mind ineradicably poisoned 
against him." 366 U. S., at 729 (Justice Frankfurter, 
concurring). 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
8 As I recently noted, in 19 consecutive cases in which the Court exer-
cised its discretion to decide a criminal case summarily, the Court made 
sure that an apparently guilty defendant was not given too much protection 
by the law. See Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984). The 
string of consecutive summary victories for the prosecution now stands at 
20. See Massachusetts v. Upton, - U. S. - (1984) (per curiam). 
jen 06/19/84 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: Dissent in 83-95 Patton v. Yount 
Most of Justice Stevens' dissent consists of a differing 
reading of the record. This does not seem to require a response. 
The one point I would suggest responding to is his discussion 
of Reynolds v. United States, which we cite in footnote 12. I 
suggest the following be added tb that footnote: 
1"" tt( 
h d • .-";~J.h"Y~ • h C ~· I • • • T e 1ssent ~ mLsc attacter 1 e.s t e ;9ur t s op1n1on 1n 
United State v. Reynolds. Postl~ 10-11. The Court 
clearly did not attach t e same significance to the 
phrase "a question of mix d law nd fact" that we do 
today under modern habea law. It recognized that 
juror-disqualification que tions raise both a question 
of law--whether the correc standard was applied--and a 
question of fact. Whether ~ juror~~ was such 
as to meet the legal stan ard for disqualification was 
pl~rnly viewed as a question of fact as to which defer-
ence was due to the trial court's determination. This 
is apparent both from the language quoted by the dis-
sent, and from the following passage: 
"In such cases the manner of the juror while testifying 
is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of 
his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but 
cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, 
therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to re-
verse the ruling below upon such a question of fact, 
except in a clear case." 98 u.s., at 156-157 (emphasis 
added) • 
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: 83-95 Patton v. Yount 
It seems silly to get into a quarrel with JPS over this one 
cite. But how about the following changes in note 12: 
(1) Sentence added to p. 11. 
(2) Add the following Rider "A": 
This is apparent from the language quoted by the dis-
sent, which notes that while the question is a one of 
"mixed law and fact," it is "to be tried, as far as 
the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that 
character, upon the evidence. The finding of the 
trial court upon that issue ought not to be set aside 
by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest." 
98 u.s., at 156. Plainly, factual findings were to 
be considered separately from the legal standard ap-
plied, and deference was due to those findings. This 
is also apparent from the following passage: 
(3) Add the following Rider "B": 
The dissent claims this passage should be read to 
mean that the question of whether a juror was impar-
i,~e I 
tial was a question of fact if he \ saiel he was par-
tial, but a mixed question of law and fact if he 
claimed impartiality. Ante, at 10, n. 6. We cannot 
attribute such incoherence to the Court's opinion. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
.invrmtt atttttrt cf flrt ~lt ~httts 
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83-95 Patton v. Yount 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFER.ENf'E 
The only response I propose to make to the ~issent in 
this case is the following addition to footnote 12: 
'T'he iHssent misreads the Court's ooinion in 
United States v. Reynolds. Post, at 10-11., 
and n. 7. The Court clearly did not attach 
the same siqnificance to the phrase "a ques-
tion of mixed law and fact" that we do today 
under modern habeas law. It recognized that 
juror-disqualification questions may raise 
both a question of law--whether the correct 
standard was applied--and a question of fact. 
Whether an opinion expressed by a juror w~s 
such as to meet the legal standard for 
disqualification was viewed as a question of 
fact as to which deference was due to the 
trial court's determination. This is appar-
ent both from the language quoted hy the dis-
sent, and from the followi.nq passage: 
"{T]he manner of the juror while testifying 
is oftentimes more indicative of the real 
character of his opinion than his words. 
That is seen below, but cannot always be 
spread upon the record. Care should, there-
fore, be taken in the reviewing court not to 
reverse the ruling below upon such a guestion 
of fact, except in a clear case." 98 u.s., 
at 156-157 (emphasis added). 
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Circulated: ___ _____ _ 
Recirculated: JUN 2 O 1984 
ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP 
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v. 
JON E. YOUNT 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so 
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his 
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury." 
I 
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-year-
old high school student, was found in a wooded area near 
her home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. 
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her 
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of stran-
gulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her 
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been 
sexually assaulted. 
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent 
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby Du-
Bois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school math-
ematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written 
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the 
confession to the press, and it was not published until after it 
was read at Yount's arraignment three days later. Ex. 
Pl-a, Pl-<1. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admit-
ted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree mur-
der and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deter-
mined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), 
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an 
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a 
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d 
464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970). 
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered 
suppression of Yount's written confessions and that portion 
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally 
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge. 
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart 
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and 
took 10 days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1,186 
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue be-
fore, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued 
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information 
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors, 
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numer-
ous newspaper and other articles about the case. The mo-
tions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles 
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the 
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's le-
niency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors; 
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or 
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any, 
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also ob-
served that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely 
attended. 
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated. 
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not 
claim temporary insanity. Instead he relied upon cross-
examination and character witnesses in an attempt to under-
mine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him 
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life 
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new 
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to 
the case between the two trials, and that little public interest 
was shown during the second trial. App. 268a. In addition, 
the court concluded that the jury was without bias. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the 
trial court's findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, 
311-314, 314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974). 
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter 
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who 
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be 
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's rec-
ommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (W. D. Pa. 1982). It held 
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor offi-
cially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside 
any preconceived notions of guilt. · It noted that the percent-
age of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to any-
one familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in 
Pennsylvania." /d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed 
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a chal-
lenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the 
jury was impartial. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710 
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis 
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that 
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in 
Clearfield County. It independently examined the nature of 
the publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at 
voir dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony 
of the jurors eventually seated. The publicity revealed 
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his 
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted 
t 
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two 
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it, 
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion 
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in 
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for 
cause because they had fixed opinions concerning the peti-
tioner's guilt. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that eight 
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted 
that at some time they had formed an opinion as to Yount's 
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given 
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside 
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both al-
ternates would have required evidence to overcome their be-
liefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of 
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and 
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented." 
710 F. 2d, at 972. 4 
1 The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the 
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the 
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F. 2d, at 969, n. 21. 
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after 
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record 
considered by the trial court. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that 
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined 
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case, 
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. !d., at 969, n. 22. The court 
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spec-
tators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising 
from the " 'circus atmosphere' " in the courtroom. Ibid. 
2 One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused 
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed 
for cause before they were questioned on the case. 
3 The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had 
formed opinions of guilt. 
'Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested 
that "the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the lower 
courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than hinge 
disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt that he 
83-95--0PINION 
PATTON v. YOUNT 5 
Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to 
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the 
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the an-
swers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He 
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voir dire 
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a commu-
nity saturated with publicity adverse to the defendant." /d., 
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his 
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have required 
evidence to change his mind about Yount's guilt. This 
stripped the defendant of the presumption of innocence. 6 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1983), to consider, 
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media 
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensa-
tional criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
II 
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the 
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v. 
Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading one at the time, held 
cannot lay aside, Judge Stem would bar any juror who admitted any opin-
ion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where more than 
25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning the de-
fendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of those 
who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stem wrote. 
5Judge Garth thought Irvin was distinguishable, because there ''the 
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not 
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979. 
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could 
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge 
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual 
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for 
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959). 
6 Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally bi-
ased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981. 
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is appli-
cable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). 
83-95--0PINION 
6 PATrON v. YOUNT 
that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption 
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they 
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in I T!Jin 
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the to-
tality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The 
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of 
impartiality might pe overturned only for "manifest error." 
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals in this case did not 
address this aspect of the IT!Jin decision. 7 Moreover, the 
court below, in concentrating on the factors discussed at 
length in IT!Jin, failed to give adequate weight to other sig-
nificant circumstances in this case. In IT!Jin, the Court ob-
served that it was during the six or seven months immedi-
ately preceding trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines, 
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the de-
fendant]." 366 U. S., at 725. In this case, the extensive ad-
verse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at 
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury se-
lection for Yount's second trial, at issue here, did not occur 
until four years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity 
was greatly diminished and community sentiment had soft-
7 The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in 
Irvin-that a federal court must ''independently evaluate" the voir dire 
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of 
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 7~meant that there is no presumption of cor-
rectness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial. 
We note that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added to the 
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court 
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years be-
fore this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), pro-
vided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little 
practical difference between the Irvin ''manifest error" standard and the 
"fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute. 
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas stand-
ard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this 
case under Irvin's ''manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine 
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might 
have required a different analysis or result in that case. 
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ened. In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court 
did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a 
whole was impartial. 
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the re-
versal of the first conviction to the start of the second voir 
dire each of the two Clearfield County daily newspapers pub-
lished an average of less than one article per month. App. 
642a-657a; Ex. P1-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many 
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial 
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspa-
pers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the 
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse public-
ity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial. 
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829, 
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers 
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were 
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or 
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selec-
tion. App. 658a-671a. In short, the record of publicity in 
the months preceding, and at the time of, the second trial 
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity imme-
diately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798 
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion," 
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin. 
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had 
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on 
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen, 
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their 
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284, 541-544, 991. In addi-
tion, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen 
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many, 
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had 
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror 
number 8); Tr. 384-385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 1075-
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1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10). 8 The 
same is true of the testimony of the jurors and veniremen 
who were seated late in the process and therefore were sub-
jected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated 
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their 
passions had not been inflamed nor their thoughts biased by 
8 The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during exami-
nation by defense counsel is illustrative: 
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years? 
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it. 
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I 
presume? 
"A. What I have read in the paper again. 
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it? 
"A. Not too many so far. 
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it? 
"A. Not too many of those so far too. 
"Q. Back around '66, did you? 
"A. Yes in '66. 
"Q. . .. I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or inno-
cence [in 1966]? 
"A. I had an opinion yes. 
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence? 
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper 
he plead [sic] not guilty. 
"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you 
wipe it out of your mind-erase it out of your mind before you would take a 
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear? 
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I 
probably did but right now I don't. 
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate 
that opinion if you can tell me? 
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about 
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a. 
'Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen. 
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771, 
959, 1027. 
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phe-
nomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552, 
561 (CA 7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should 
have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is a great 
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."), 
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802; 
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all 
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the 
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and 
were disqualified. But the testimony suggests that the voir 
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would 
need to be persuaded again. 10 
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the 
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed 
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable public-
ity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969. 
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The 
relevant question is not whether the community remembered 
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such 
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt 
of the defendant. Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual 
10 As noted, the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took 
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In Irvin it took 8 days to 
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen. 
Contrary to Judge Garth's sunnise, 710 F. 2d, at 979, however, the voir 
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be 
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in 
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that 
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for 
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the 
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were 
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that 
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel. 
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin, 
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling. 
' ' 
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that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was 
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that 
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to at-
tempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself 
would distinguish the situation that existed in Irvin. 11 But it 
is clear that the. passage of time between a first and a second 
trial can be a highly relevant fact. In the circumstances of 
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of 
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial 
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial 
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there 
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter 
through the news media," and that there had not been "any 
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a. 
III 
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the 
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges 
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial 
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for ha-
beas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied 
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at 
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring). 
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did 
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors dur-
ing the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below 
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have re-
quired Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination 
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel 
11 In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely 
lmown as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of dam-
aging publicity preceding his trial was at least as extreme as that in this 
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin. 
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy 
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. I d., 
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first 
trial; there was no second trial in that case. 
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates 
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement 
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from 
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will 
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors. 
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that 
the question whether jurors have opinions that disqualify 
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at 
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption 
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied 
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin 
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a ques-
tion we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analy-
sis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which 
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That 
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is 
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could 
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the 
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality 
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain, -- U. S. --, 
-- (1983) (state court determination that juror's delibera-
tions were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding 
of fact). 12 
12 There are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in de-
ciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a ju-
ror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see 
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a determination 
to which habeas courts owe special deference, see Rushen, supra, at-. I 
Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis 
as to whether a guilty plea was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U. S. 145, 156 (1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a 
question involving both a legal standard and findings of fact; the latter may ~ 
be set aside only for manifest error). The dissent misreads the Court's 
opinion in United States v. Reynolds. Post, at 10-11, and n. 7. The 
Court clearly did not attach the same significance to the phrase "a question 
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There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption 
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these ques-
tions. First, the determination has been made only after an 
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to 
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the 
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C. C. D. Va. 1807) (Mar-
shall, C. J.), usually identifies bias. 13 Second, the deter-
mination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore 
largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous oc-
casions, the trial court's resolution of such questions is enti-
tled, even on direct appeal, to "special deference." E. g., 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,-- U.S. 
--, -- (1984). The respect paid such findings in a habeas 
proceeding certainly should be no less. See Marshall v. 
of mixed law and fact" that we do today under modern habeas law. It rec-
ognized that juror-disqualification questions may raise both a question of 
law-whether the correct standard was applied-and a question of fact. 
Whether an opinion expressed by a juror was such as to meet the legal 
standard for disqualification was viewed as a question of fact as to which 
deference was due to the trial court's determination. This is apparent 
both from the language quoted by the dissent, and from the following 
passage: 
"[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of 
the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but 
cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be 
taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a 
question of fact, except in a clear case." 98 U. S., at 156-157 (emphasis 
added). 
13 Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609, 
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective 
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and 
thoroughgoing manner."); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865 
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982) 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state proce-
dures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 
(1963) (same). 
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Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 434-435 (1983). 14 
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the 
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here 
would be impartial. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(8). The testi-
mony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and 
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire 
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case. 
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may 
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions 
and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed, 
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors rep-
resent a cross-section of the community, and their education 
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, pro-
spective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to tak-
ing the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to 
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every 
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that 
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve 
impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe 
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that 
appeared to have been least influenced by leading. 
The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scru-
tinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as 
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury 
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial 
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in his 
testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the chal-
lenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission to 
resume cross-examination. In response to a question 
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the 
14 Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credi-
bility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying. 
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express 
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a 
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions 
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible. 
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jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the ju-
ror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it 
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very 
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things 
you have to do every day." App. 89a. After this categori-
cal answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for 
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we 
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testi-
mony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside 
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which 
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need 
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a, 
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the 
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered 
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the 
federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold 
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell 
which of these answers was said with the greatest compre-
hension and certainty. 
IV 
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of 
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion" 
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that 
was empaneled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambi-
guity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were chal-
lenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption 
of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We there-
fore reverse. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u.prenu arautt d tire ~tt~ ~htttg 
,rulfi:n:ghtn. ~. ar. 2ll.;t'!' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 20, 1984 
Re: 83-95 - Patton v. Yount 
Dear Lewis: 
~; ~~ 
In response to your most recent change, I will be 
adding the following to the beginning of footnote 6: 
The Court attempts to justify its disregard 5 ~lL 
of Reynolds and Irvin by quoting from a passage in ~ ~ r 
Reynolds that begins with: "fT]he manner of the 
juror while testifying is oftentimes more 
indicative of the real character of his opinion 
than his words." Ante, at 11 n. 12 (quoting 98 
u.s., at 156-157). That passage refers to a 
situation involving a juror falsely seeking to 
excuse himself on the ground that he has formeo a 
disqualifying opinion, when he has no 
disqualifying opinion. Obviously, that situation 
is not involved here as Hrin was not falsely 
seeking to disqualify himself. The fully quoted 
relevant passage of Reynolds demonstrates this 
point: 
The reading of the evidence leaves the 
impression that the juror has some 
hypothetical opinion about the case, but it 
falls far short of raising a manifest 
presumption of partiality. In considering 
such questions in a reviewing court, we ought 
not to be unmindful of the fact we have so 
often observed in our experience, that jurors 
not unfrequently seek to excuse themselves on 
the ground of having formed an opinion, when 
on examination, it turns out that no 
disqualification exists. In such cases the 
manner of the juror while testifying is 
oftentimes more indicative of the real 
character of his opinion than his words. 
~hat is seen below, but cannot always be 
-2-
spread upon the record. Care should, 
therefore, be taken in the reviewing court 
not to reverse the ruling below upon such a 
question of fact except in a clear case. 98 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
PATTON ET AL. v. YOUNT 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 83-95. Argued February 28, 1984-Decided June 26, 1984 
After a jury trial in a Pennsylvania state court in 1966, respondent was 
convicted of first-degree murder and rape, and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. However, on direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that the police had violated respondent's constitutional rights 
in securing confessions that had been admitted in evidence, and re-
manded the case for a new trial. Before and during an extensive voir 
dire examination of potential jurors at the second trial in 1970, respond-
ent moved for a change of venue, arguing that publicity concerning the 
case had resulted in dissemination of prejudicial information that could 
not be eradicated from the potential jurors' minds. The trial court de-
nied the motions, and respondent was convicted again of first-degree 
murder. He was resentenced to life imprisonment, and the trial court 
denied a motion for a new trial, finding that practically no publicity had 
been given to the case between the two trials, that little public interest 
was shown during the second trial, and that the jury was without bias. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the trial 
court's findings. Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in Fed-
eral District Court, claiming that his conviction had been obtained in vi-
olation of his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a 
fair trial by an impartial jury. Upholding the state trial court's view 
that the jury was impartial, the District Court denied relief, but the 
Court of Appeals reversed. Relying primarily on Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U. S. 717, the court found that pretrial publicity had made a fair trial 
impossible in the county. 
Held: 
1. The voir dire testimony and the record of publicity do not reveal the 
kind of "wave of public passion" that would have made a fair trial un-
likely by the empaneled jury as a whole. Although Irvin v. Dowd, 
lU -
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Syllabus 
supra, held that adverse publicity can create such a presumption of prej-
udice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial 
should not be believed, it also recognized that the trial court's findings of 
impartiality may be overturned only for "manifest error." In this case, 
the extensive adverse publicity and the community's sense of outrage 
were at their height prior to respondent's first trial. The record shows 
that prejudicial publicity was greatly diminished and community senti-
ment had softened when the jury for the second trial was selected four 
years later. Thus the trial court did not commit manifest error in find-
ing that the jury as a whole was imp~ial. Potential jurors who had 
retained fixed opinions as to respondent's guilt were disqualified, and the 
fact that the great majority of veniremen "remembered the case," with-
out more, is essentially irrelevant. The relevant question is whether 
the jurors at respondent's second trial had such fixed opinions that they 
could not judge impartially respondent's guilt. The passage of time be-
tween the first and second trial clearly rebutted any presumption of par-
tiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial trial. Pp. 5-10. 
2. There is no merit in respondent's argument that one of the selected 
jurors, as well as the two alternates, had been erroneously seated over 
his challenges for cause. The ambiguity in the testimony of the cited 
jurors was insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness, 
under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), owed to the trial court's findings. The 
question of an individual juror's partiality is plainly one of historical fact, 
and there is fair support in the record for the state courts' conclusion 
that the jurors here would be impartial. Pp. 10-14. 
710 F. 2d 956, reversed. 
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STE-
VENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined. MAR-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-95 
ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP 
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v. 
JON E. YOUNT 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so 
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his 
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury." 
I 
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-year-
old high school student, was found in a wooded area near 
her home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. 
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her 
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of stran-
gulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her 
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been 
sexually assaulted. 
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent 
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby Du-
Bois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school math-
ematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written 
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the 
confession to the press, and it was not published until after 
it was read at Y aunt's arraignment three days later. Ex. 
P1-a, P1-d. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admit-
ted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree mur-
der and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deter-
mined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), 
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an 
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a 
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d 
464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970). 
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered 
suppression of Yount's written confessions and that portion 
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally 
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge. 
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart 
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and 
took 10 days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1,186 
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue be-
fore, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued 
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information 
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors, 
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numer-
ous newspaper and other articles about the case. The mo-
tions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles 
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the 
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's le-
niency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors; 
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or 
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any, 
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also ob-
served that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely 
attended. 
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated. 
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not 
claim temporary insanity. Instead he relied upon cross-
examination and character witnesses in an attempt to under-
mine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him 
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life 
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new 
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to 
the case between the two trials, and that little public interest 
was shown during the second trial. App. 268a. In addition, 
the court concluded that the jury was without bias. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the 
trial court's findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, 
311-314, 314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974). 
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter 
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who 
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be 
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's rec-
ommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (W. D. Pa. 1982). It held 
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor offi-
cially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside 
any preconceived notions of guilt. It noted that the percent-
age of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to any-
one familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in 
Pennsylvania." I d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed 
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a chal-
lenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the 
jury was impartial. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710 
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis 
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that 
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in Clear-
field County. It independently examined the nature of the 
publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at voir 
dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony of 
the jurors eventually seated. The publicity revealed 
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his 
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted 
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two 
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it, 
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion 
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in 
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for 
cause because they had fixed opinions concerning the peti-
tioner's guilt. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that eight 
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted 
that at some time they had formed an opinion as to Yount's 
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given 
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside 
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both al-
ternates would have required evidence to overcome their be-
liefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of 
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and 
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented." 
710 F. 2d, at 972. 4 
1 The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the 
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the 
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F. 2d, at 969, n. 21. 
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after 
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record 
considered by the trial court. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that 
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined 
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case, 
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. !d., at 969, n. 22. The court 
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spec-
tators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising 
from the "'circus atmosphere' " in the courtroom. Ibid. 
2 One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused 
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed 
for cause before they were questioned on the case. 
3 The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had 
formed opinions of guilt. 
• Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested 
that ''the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the lower 
courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than hinge 
disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt that he 
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Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to 
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the 
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the an-
swers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He 
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voir dire 
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a commu-
nity saturated with publicity adverse to the defendant." I d., 
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his 
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have required 
evidence to change his mind about Yount's guilt. This 
stripped the defendant of the presumption of innocence. 6 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1983), to consider, 
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media 
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensa-
tional criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
II 
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the 
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v. 
Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading one at the time, held 
cannot lay aside, Judge Stern would bar any juror who admitted any opin-
ion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where more than 
25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning the de-
fendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of those 
who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stern wrote. 
5 Judge Garth thought I ruin was distinguishable, because there "the 
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not 
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979. 
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could 
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge 
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual 
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for 
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959). 
'Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally bi-
ased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981. 
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is appli-
cable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). 
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that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption 
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they 
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in Irvin 
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the to-
tality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The 
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of 
impartiality might be overturned only for "manifest error." 
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals in this case did not 
address this aspect of the Irvin decision. 7 Moreover, the 
court below, in concentrating on the factors discussed at 
length in Irvin, failed to give adequate weight to other sig-
nificant circumstances in this case. In Irvin, the Court ob-
served that it was during the six or seven months immedi-
ately preceding trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines, 
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the de-
fendant]." 366 U. S., at 725. In this case, the extensive ad-
verse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at 
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury se-
lection for YoUJit's second trial, at issue here, did not occur 
until four years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity 
was greatly diminished and community sentiment had soft-
7 The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in 
Irvin-that a federal court must "independently evaluate" the voir dire 
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of 
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 723-meant that there is no presumption of cor-
rectness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial. 
We note that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added to the 
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court 
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years be-
fore this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), pro-
vided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little 
practical difference between the Irvin ''manifest error" standard and the 
"fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute. 
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas stand-
ard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this 
case under Irvin's "manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine 
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might 
have required a different analysis or result in that case. 
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ened. In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court 
did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a 
whole was impartial. 
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the re-
versal of the first conviction to the start of the second voir 
dire each of the two Clearfield County daily newspapers pub-
lished an average of less than one article per month. App. 
642a-657a; Ex. P1-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many 
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial 
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspa-
pers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the 
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse public-
ity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial. 
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829, 
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers 
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were 
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or 
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selec-
tion. App. 658a-671a. In short, the record of publicity in 
the months preceding, and at the time of, the .second trial 
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity imme-
diately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798 
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion," 
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin. 
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had 
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on 
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen, 
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their 
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284, 541-544, 991. In addi-
tion, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen 
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many, 
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had 
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror 
number 8); Tr. 384-385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 1075-
83-9&-0PINION 
8 PATTON v. YOUNT 
1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10). 8 
The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and venire-
men who were seated late in the process and therefore were 
subjected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated 
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their 
passions had not been inflamed nor their thoughts biased by 
1 The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during exami-
nation by defense counsel is illustrative: 
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years? 
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it. 
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I 
presume? 
"A. What I have read in the paper again. 
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it? 
"A. Not too many so far. 
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it? 
"A. Not too many of those so far too. 
"Q. Back around '66, did you? 
"A. Yes in '66. 
"Q. . . . I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or inno-
cence [in 1966]? 
"A. I had an opinion yes. 
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence? 
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper 
he plead [sic] not guilty. 
"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you 
wipe it out of your mind-erase it out of your mind before you would take a 
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear? 
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I 
probably did but right now I don't. 
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate 
that opinion if you can tell me? 
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about 
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a. 
'Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen. 
'f 
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771, 
959, 1027. 
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phe-
nomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552, 
561 (CA7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should 
have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is a great 
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."), 
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802; 
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all 
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the 
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and 
were disqualified. But the testimony suggests that the voir 
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would 
need to be persuaded again. 10 
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the 
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed 
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable public-
ity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969. 
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The 
relevant question is not whether the community remembered 
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such 
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt 
of the defendant:· Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual 
10 As noted, the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took 
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In Irvin it took 8 days to 
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen. 
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F. 2d, at 979, however, the voir 
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be 
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in 
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that 
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for 
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the 
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were 
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that 
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel. 
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin, 
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling. 
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that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was 
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that 
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to at-
tempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself 
would distinguish the situation that existed in Irvin. 11 But it 
is clear that the passage of time between a first and a second 
trial can be a highly relevant fact. In the circumstances of 
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of 
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial 
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial 
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there 
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter 
through the news media," and that there had not been "any 
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a. 
III 
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the 
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges 
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial 
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for ha-
beas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied 
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at 
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring). 
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did 
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors dur-
ing the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below 
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have re-
quired Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination 
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel 
11 In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely 
known as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of dam-
aging publicity preceding his trial was at feast as extreme as that in this 
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin. 
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy 
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. I d., 
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first 
trial; there was no second trial in that case. 
,. 
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates 
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement 
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from 
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will 
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors. 
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that 
the question whether jurors have opinions that disqualify 
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at 
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption 
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied 
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin 
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a ques-
tion we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analy-
sis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which 
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That 
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is 
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could 
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the 
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality 
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain,-- U. S. --, 
-- (1983) (state court detennination that juror's delibera-
tions were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding 
of fact). 12 
uThere are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in de-
ciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a ju-
ror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see 
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a determination 
to which habeas courts owe special deference, see Rushen, supra, at-. 
Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis 
as to whether a guilty plea was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a 
question involving both a legal standard and findings of fact; the latter may 
be set aside only for manifest error). The dissent misreads the Court's 
opinion in United States v. Reynolds. Post, at 10-11, and n. 7. Reynolds 
was decided some 87 years before the presumption of correctness for fac-
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There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption 
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these ques-
tions. First, the determination has been made only after an 
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to 
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the 
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C. C. D. Va. 1807) (Mar-
shall, C. J.), usually identifies bias. 13 Second, the deter-
tual findings was added to 28 U. S. C. § 2254. The Court clearly did not 
attach the same significance to the phrase "a question of mixed law and 
fact" that we do today under modern habeas law. It recognized that juror-
disqualification questions may raise both a question of law-whether the 
correct standard was applied-and a question of fact. Whether an opinion 
expressed by a juror was such as to meet the legal standard for disquali-
fication was viewed as a question of fact as to which deference was due to 
the trial court's determination. This is apparent from the language quoted 
by the dissent, which notes that while the question is a one of "mixed law 
and fact," it is "to be tried, as far as the facts are concerned, like any other 
issue of that character, upon the evidence. The finding of the trial court 
upon that issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the 
error is manifest." 98 U. S., at 156. Plainly, ctual findin s were to be o.. 
considered separately from the legal standard app e , and deference was 
due to those findings. This is also apparent from the following passage: 
"[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of 
the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but 
cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be 
taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a 
question of fact, except in a clear case." 98 U.S., at 156-157 (emphasis 
added). The dissent claims this passage should be read to mean that the 
question of whether a juror was impartial was a question of fact if he indi-
cated he was partial, but a mixed question of law and fact if he claimed 
impartiality. Ante, at 10, n. 6. We cannot attribute such incoherence to 
the Court's opinion. 
13 Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609, 
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective 
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and 
thoroughgoing manner."); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865 
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982) 
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mination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore 
largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous oc-
casions, the trial court's resolution of such questions is enti-
tled, even on direct appeal, to "special deference." E. g., 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., -- U. S. 
--, -- (1984). The respect paid such findings in a habeas 
proceeding certainly should be no less. See Marshall v. 
Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 434-435 (1983). 14 
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the 
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here 
would be impartial. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(8). The testi-
mony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and 
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire 
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case. 
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may 
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions 
and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed, 
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors rep-
resent a cross-section of the community, and their education 
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, pro-
spective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to tak-
ing the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to 
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every 
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that 
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve 
impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe 
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that 
appeared to have been least influenced by leading. 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state proce-
dures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 
(1963) (same). 
1
' Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credi-
bility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying. 
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express 
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a 
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions 
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible. 
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The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scru-
tinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as 
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury 
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial 
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in 
his testimony, was confinned after he initially denied the 
challenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission 
to resume cross-examination. In response to a question 
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the 
jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the ju-
ror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it 
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very 
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things 
you have to do every day." App. 89a. Mter this categori-
cal answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for 
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we 
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testi-
mony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside 
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which 
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need 
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a, 
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the 
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered 
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the 
federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold 
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell 
which of these answers was said with the greatest compre-
hension and certainty. 
IV 
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of 
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion" 
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that 
was empaneled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambi-
guity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were chal-
lenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption 
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of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We there-
fore reverse. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this .case. 
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: 83-95 Patton v. Yount 
Justice Stevens' latest change requires that we change our 
earlier response. I suggest we insert the following in place of 
the final two sentences of footnote 12: 
Taken together, these passages plainly show that the 
"character of [a juror's] opinion" was considered a 
question of fact. Contrary to the suggestion of the 
dissent, ante, at 11, n. 6, the factual question was 
not limited to whether the juror was telling the truth, 
but included discq:>vering the "real character" of any 
opinion held. Deference was due to the trial court's 
conclusions on that question. 
I hope this will lay the matter to rest; the case is set to come 
down on Tuesday. 
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Re: 83-95 - Patton v. Yount 
Dear Lewis: 
In response to your latest circulation, I have 
replaced the second and third sentences of my 
footnote 6 on page 11 with the following: 
The excerpt from Reynolds quoted by the Court, 
ante, at 12, n. 12, dealt with the question 
whether a juror's testimony was truthful--
specifically whether a prospective juror was 
falsely seeking to disqualify himself. In this 
case the question is whether Hrin's testimony, 
including his acknowledged optnton about Yount's 
guilt, raised a presumption of partiality. 
Whether the testimony of a witness is true or 
false is a question of fact: whether his 
statement rajses a presumption of partiality is 
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to fonnal revision before publication in the 
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court ofthe United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
ii'O~la~ed: · 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-95 
ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP 
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v. 
JON E. YOUNT 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[June 26, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so 
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his 
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury." 
I 
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-year-
old high school student, was found in a wooded area near 
her home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. 
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her 
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of stran-
gulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her 
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been 
sexually assaulted. 
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent 
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby Du-
Bois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school math-
ematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written 
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the 
confession to the press, and it was not published until after 
it was read at Yount's arraignment three days later. Ex. 
P1-a, P1-d. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admit-
ted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
.' 
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree mur-
der and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deter-
mined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), 
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an 
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a 
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d 
464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970). 
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered 
suppression of Y aunt's written confessions and that portion 
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally 
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge. 
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart 
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and 
took 10 days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1,186 
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue be-
fore, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued 
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information 
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors, 
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numer-
ous newspaper and other articles about the case. The mo-
tions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles 
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the 
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's le-
niency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors; 
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or 
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any, 
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also ob-
served that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely 
attended. 
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated. 
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not 
claim temporary insanity. Instead he relied upon cross-
examination and character witnesses in an attempt to under-
mine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him 
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life 
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new 
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to 
the case between the two trials , and that little public interest 
was shown during the second trial. App. 268a. In addition, 
the court concluded that the jury was without bias. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the 
trial court's findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, 
311-314, 314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974). 
In January 1981, Y aunt filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter 
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who 
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be 
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's rec-
ommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (WD Pa. 1982). It held 
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor offi-
cially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside 
any preconceived notions of guilt. It noted that the percent-
age of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to any-
one familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in 
Pennsylvania." I d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed 
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a chal~ 
lenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the 
jury was impartial. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710 
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis 
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that 
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in Clear-
field County. It independently examined the nature of the 
publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at voir 
dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony of 
the jurors eventually seated. The publicity revealed 
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his 
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted 
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two 
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it, 
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion 
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in 
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for 
cause because they had fixed opinions concerning the peti-
tioner's guilt. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that eight 
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted 
that at some time they had formed an opinion as to Yount's 
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given 
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside 
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both al-
ternates would have required evidence to overcome their be-
liefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of 
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and 
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented." 
710 F. 2d, at 972. 4 
'The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the 
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the 
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F . 2d, at 969, n. 21. 
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after 
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record 
considered by the trial court. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that 
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined 
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case, 
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. I d., at 969, n. 22. The court 
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spec-
tators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising 
from the "'circus atmosphere' " in the courtroom. Ibid. 
2 One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused 
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed 
for cause before they were questioned on the case. 
8 The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had 
formed opinions of guilt. 
' Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he sug-
gested that "the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the 
lower courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than 
hinge disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt 
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Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to 
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the 
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the an-
swers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He 
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voir dire 
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a commu-
nity saturated with publicity adverse to the defendant." !d., 
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his 
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have required 
evidence to change his mind about Yount's guilt. This 
stripped the defendant of the presumption of innocence. 6 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1983), to consider, 
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media 
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensa-
tional criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
II 
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the 
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v. 
that he cannot lay aside, Judge Stern would bar any juror who admitted 
any opinion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where 
more than 25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning 
the defendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of 
those who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stern 
wrote. 
•Judge Garth thought Irvin was distinguishable, because there "the 
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not 
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979. 
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could 
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge 
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual 
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for 
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959). 
6 Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally bi-
ased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981. 
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is appli-
cable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). 
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Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading one at the time, held 
that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption 
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they 
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in Irvin 
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the to-
tality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The 
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of 
impartiality might be overturned only for "manifest error." 
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals in this case did not 
address this aspect of the Irvin decision. 7 Moreover, the 
court below, in concentrating on the factors discussed at 
length in Irvin, failed to give adequate weight to other sig-
nificant circumstances in this case. In Irvin, the Court ob-
served that it was during the six or seven months immedi-
ately preceding trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines, 
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the de-
fendant]." 366 U. S., at 725. In this case, the extensive ad-
verse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at 
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury se-
lection for Yount's second trial, at issue here, did not occur 
until four years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity 
7 The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in 
Irvin--that a federal court must "independently evaluate" the voir dire 
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of 
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 723--meant that there is no presumption of cor-
rectness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial. 
We note that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added to the 
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court 
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years be-
fore this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), pro-
vided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little 
practical difference between the Irvin "manifest error" standard and the 
"fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute. 
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas stand-
ard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this 
case under Irvin's "manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine 
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might 
have required a different analysis or result in that case. 
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was greatly diminished and community sentiment had soft-
ened. In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court 
did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a 
whole was impartial. 
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the re-
versal of the first conviction to the start of the second voir 
dire each of the two Clearfield County daily newspapers pub-
lished an average of less than one article per month. App. 
642a-657a; Ex. P1-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many 
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial 
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspa-
pers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the 
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse public-
ity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial. 
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829, 
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers 
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were 
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or 
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selec-
tion. App. 658a-671a. In short, the record of publicity in 
the months preceding, and at the time of, the second trial 
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity imme-
diately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798 
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion," 
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin. 
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had 
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on 
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen, 
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their 
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284, 541-544, 991. In addi-
tion, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen 
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many, 
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had 
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror 
number 8); Tr. 384-385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 1075-
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1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10). 8 
The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and venire-
men who were seated late in the process and therefore were 
subjected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated 
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their 
passions had not been inflamed nor their thoughts biased by 
8 The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during exami-
nation by defense counsel is illustrative: 
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years? 
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it. 
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I 
presume? 
"A. What I have read in the paper again. 
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it? 
"A. Not too many so far. 
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it? 
"A. Not too many of those so far too. 
"Q. Back around '66, did you? 
"A. Yes in '66. 
"Q. . .. I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or inno-
cence [in 1966]? 
"A. I had an opinion yes. 
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence? 
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper 
he plead [sic] not guilty. 
"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you 
wipe it out of your mind-erase it out of your mind before you would take a 
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear? 
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I 
probably did but right now I don't. 
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate 
that opinion if you can tell me? 
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about 
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a. 
9 Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen. 
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771, 
959, 1027. 
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phe-
nomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552, 
561 (CA 7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should 
have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is a great 
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."), 
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802; 
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all 
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the 
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and 
were disqualified. But the testimony suggests that the voir 
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would 
need to be persuaded again. 10 
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the 
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed 
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable public-
ity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969. 
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The 
relevant question is not whether the community remembered 
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such 
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt 
of the defendant. Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual 
10 As noted, the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took 
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In Irvin it took 8 days to 
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen. 
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F. 2d, at 979, however, the voir 
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be 
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in 
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that 
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for 
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the 
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were 
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that 
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel. 
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin, 
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling. 
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that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was 
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that 
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to at-
tempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself 
would distinguish the situation that existed in Irvin.11 But it 
is clear that the passage of time between a first and a second 
trial can be a highly relevant fact. In the circumstances of 
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of 
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial 
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial 
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there 
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter 
through the news media," and that there had not been "any 
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a. 
III 
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the 
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges 
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial 
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for ha-
beas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied 
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at 
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring). 
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did 
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors dur-
ing the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below 
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have re-
quired Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination 
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel 
11 In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely 
known as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of dam-
aging publicity preceding his trial was at least as extreme as that in this 
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin. 
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy 
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. I d., 
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first 
trial; there was no second trial in that case. 
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates 
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement 
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from 
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will 
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors. 
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that 
the question whether jurors have opinions that disqualify 
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at 
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption 
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied 
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin 
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a ques-
tion we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analy-
sis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which 
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That 
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is 
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could 
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the 
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality 
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain,-- U.S.--, 
-- (1983) (state court determination that juror's delibera-
tions were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding 
of fact). 12 
12 There are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in 
deciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a 
juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see 
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a determination 
to which habeas courts owe special deference, see Rushen, supra, at-. 
Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis 
as to whether a guilty plea was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U. S. 145, 156 (1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a 
question involving both a legal standard and findings of fact; the latter may 
be set aside only for manifest error). 
The dissent misreads the Court's opinion in United States v. Reynolds. 
Post, at 11-13, and nn. 6 and 7. Reynolds was decided some 87 years be-
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There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption 
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these ques-
tions. First, the determination has been made only after an 
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to 
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the 
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (CCD Va. 1807) (Mar-
. shall, C. J.), usually identifies bias. 13 Second, the deter-
fore the presumption of correctness for factual findings was added to 28 
U. S. C. § 2254. The Court clearly did not attach the same significance to 
the phrase "a question of mixed law and fact" that we do today under mod-
ern habeas law. It recognized that juror-disqualification questions may 
raise both a question of law-whether the correct standard was applied-
and a question of fact. Whether an opinion expressed by a juror was such 
as to meet the legal standard for disqualification was viewed as a question 
of fact as to which deference was due to the trial court's determination. 
This is apparent from the language quoted by the dissent, which notes that 
while the question is one of"mixed law and fact," it is "to be tried, as far as 
the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that character, upon the 
evidence. The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set 
aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest." 98 U. S., at 156. 
Plainly, factual findings were to be considered separately from the legal 
standard applied, and deference was due to those findings. This is also 
apparent from the following passage: 
"[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative 
of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but 
cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be 
taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a 
question of fact, except in a clear case." 98 U. S., at 156-157 (emphasis 
added). 
Taken together, these passages plainly show that the "character of [a ju-
ror's] opinion" was considered a question of fact. Contrary to the sugges-
tion of the dissent, ante, at 11, n. 6, the factual question was not limited to 
whether the juror was telling the truth, but included discovering the "real 
character" of any opinion held. Deference was due to the trial court's con-
clusions on that question. 
13 Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609, 
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective 
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and 
thoroughgoing manner"); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865 
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mination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore 
largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous oc-
casions, the trial court's resolution of such questions is enti-
tled, even on direct appeal, to "special deference." E. g., 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., -- U. S. 
--, -- (1984). The respect paid such findings in a habeas 
proceeding certainly should be no less. See Marshall v. 
Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 434-435 (1983). 14 
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the 
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here 
would be impartial. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(8). The testi-
mony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and 
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire 
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case. 
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may 
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions 
and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed, 
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors rep-
resent a cross-section of the community, and their education 
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, pro-
spective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to tak-
ing the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to 
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every 
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that 
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve 
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982) 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state proce-
dures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 
(1963) (same). 
14 Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credi-
bility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying. 
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express 
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a 
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions 
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible. 
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impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe 
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that 
appeared to have been least influenced by leading. 
The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scru-
tinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as 
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury 
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial 
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in 
his testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the 
challenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission 
to resume cross-examination. In response to a question 
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the 
jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the ju-
ror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it 
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very 
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things 
you have to do every day." App. 89a. After this categori-
cal answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for 
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we 
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testi-
mony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside 
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which 
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need 
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a, 
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the 
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered 
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the 
federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold 
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell 
which of these answers was said with the greatest compre-
hension and certainty. 
IV 
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of 
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion" 
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that 
was empaneled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambi-
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guity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were chal-
lenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption 
of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We there-
fore reverse. 
It is so ordered. 
J USTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[June 26, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so 
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his 
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury." 
I 
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-year-
old high school student, was found in a wooded area near 
her home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. 
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her 
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of stran-
gulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her 
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been 
sexually assaulted. 
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent 
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby Du-
Bois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school math-
ematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written 
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the 
confession to the press, and it was not published until after 
it was read at Yount's arraignment three days later. Ex. 
P1-a, P1-d. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admit-
ted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree mur-
der and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deter-
mined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), 
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an 
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a 
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d 
464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970). 
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered 
suppression of Yount's written confessions and that portion 
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally 
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge. 
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart 
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and 
took 10 days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1,186 
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue be-
fore, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued 
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information 
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors, 
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numer-
ous newspaper and other articles about the case. The mo-
tions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles 
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the 
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's le-
niency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors; 
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or 
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any, 
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also ob-
served that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely 
attended. 
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated. 
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not 
claim temporary insanity. Instead he relied upon cross-
examination and character witnesses in an attempt to under-
mine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him 
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life 
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new 
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to 
the case between the two trials, and that little public interest 
was shown during the second trial. App. 268a. In addition, 
the court concluded that the jury was without bias. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the 
trial court's findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, 
311-314, 314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974). 
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter 
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who 
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be 
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's rec-
ommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (WD Pa. 1982). It held 
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor offi-
cially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside 
any preconceived notions of guilt. It noted that the percent-
age of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to any-
one familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in 
Pennsylvania." I d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed 
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a chal~ 
lenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the 
jury was impartial. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710 
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis 
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that 
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in Clear-
field County. It independently examined the nature of the 
publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at voir 
dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony of 
the jurors eventually seated. The publicity revealed 
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his 
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted 
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two 
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it, 
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion 
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in 
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for 
cause because they had fixed opinions concerning the peti-
tioner's guilt. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that eight 
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted 
that at some time they had formed an opinion as to Yount's 
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given 
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside 
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both al-
ternates would have required evidence to overcome their be-
liefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of 
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and 
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented." 
710 F. 2d, at 972. 4 
1 The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the 
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the 
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F. 2d, at 969, n. 21. 
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after 
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record 
considered by the trial court. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that 
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined 
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case, 
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. I d., at 969, n. 22. The court 
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spec-
tators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising 
from the "'circus atmosphere'" in the courtroom. Ibid. 
2 One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused 
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed 
for cause before they were questioned on the case. 
8 The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had 
formed opinions of guilt. 
'Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he sug-
gested that "the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the 
lower courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than 
hinge disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt 
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Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to 
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the 
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the an-
swers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He 
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voi1· dire 
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a commu-
nity saturated with publicity adverse to the defendant. " !d., 
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his 
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have required 
evidence to change his mind about Y aunt's guilt. This 
stripped the defendant of the presumption of innocence. 6 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1983), to consider, 
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media 
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensa-
tional criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
II 
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the 
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v. 
that he cannot lay aside, Judge Stern would bar any juror who admitted 
any opinion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where 
more than 25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning 
the defendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of 
those who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stern 
wrote. 
6Judge Garth thought Irvin was distinguishable , because there "the 
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not 
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979. 
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could 
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge 
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual 
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for 
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959). 
6 Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally bi-
ased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981. 
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is appli-
cable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). 
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Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading one at the time, held 
that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption 
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they 
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in lTvin 
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the to-
tality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The 
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of 
impartiality might be overturned only for "manifest error." 
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals in this case did not 
address this aspect of the !Tvin decision. 7 Moreover, the 
court below, in concentrating on the factors discussed at 
length in Iroin, failed to give adequate weight to other sig-
nificant circumstances in this case. In Iroin, the Court ob-
served that it was during the six or seven months immedi-
ately preceding trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines, 
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the de-
fendant]." 366 U. S., at 725. In this case, the extensive ad-
verse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at 
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury se-
lection for Yount's second trial, at issue here, did not occur 
until four years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity 
7 The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in 
Irvin-that a federal court must "independently evaluate" the voir dire 
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of 
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 723-meant that there is no presumption of cor-
rectness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial. 
We note that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added to the 
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court 
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years be-
fore this Court's opinion in Toumsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), pro-
vided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little 
practical difference between the Irvin "manifest error" standard and the 
"fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute. 
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas stand-
ard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this 
case under Irvin's ''manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine 
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might 
have required a different analysis or result in that case. 
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was greatly diminished and community sentiment had soft-
ened. In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court 
did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a 
whole was impartial. 
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the re-
versal of the first conviction to the start of the second voir 
dire each of the two Clearfield County daily newspapers pub-
lished an average of less than one article per month. App. 
642a-657a; Ex. Pl-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many 
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial 
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspa-
pers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the 
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse public-
ity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial. 
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829, 
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers 
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were 
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or 
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selec-
tion. App. 658a-671a. In short, the record of publicity in 
the months preceding, and at the time of, the second trial 
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity imme-
diately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798 
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion," 
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin. 
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had 
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on 
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen, 
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their 
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284, 541-544, 991. In addi-
tion, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen 
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many, 
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had 
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror 
number 8); Tr. 384-385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 1075-
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1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10). 8 
The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and venire-
men who were seated late in the process and therefore were 
subjected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated 
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their 
passions had not been inflamed nor their thoughts biased by 
8 The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during exami-
nation by defense counsel is illustrative: 
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years? 
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it. 
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I 
presume? 
"A. What I have read in the paper again. 
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it? 
"A. Not too many so far. 
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it? 
"A. Not too many of those so far too. 
"Q. Back around '66, did you? 
"A. Yes in '66. 
"Q. . .. I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or inno-
cence [in 1966]? 
"A. I had an opinion yes. 
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence? 
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper 
he plead [sic] not guilty. 
"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you 
wipe it out of your mind~rase it out of your mind before you would take a 
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear? 
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I 
probably did but right now I don't. 
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate 
that opinion if you can tell me? 
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about 
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a. 
• Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen. 
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771, 
959, 1027. 
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phe-
nomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552, 
561 (CA 7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should 
have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is a great 
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."), 
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802; 
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all 
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the 
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and 
were disqualified. But the testimony suggests that the voir 
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would 
need to be persuaded again. 10 
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the 
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed 
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable public-
ity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969. 
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The 
relevant question is not whether the community remembered 
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such 
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt 
of the defendant. Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual 
10 As noted, the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took 
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In /ruin it took 8 days to 
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen. 
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F . 2d, at 979, however, the voir 
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be 
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in 
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that 
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for 
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the 
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were 
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that 
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel. 
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin , 
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling. 
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that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was 
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that 
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to at-
tempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself 
would distinguish the situation that existed in lrvin. 11 But it 
is clear that the passage of time between a first and a second 
trial can be a highly relevant fact. In the circumstances of 
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of 
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial 
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial 
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there 
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter 
through the news media," and that there had not been "any 
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a. 
III 
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the 
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges 
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial 
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for ha-
beas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied 
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at 
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring). 
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did 
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors dur-
ing the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below 
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have re-
quired Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination 
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel 
11 In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely 
known as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of dam-
aging publicity preceding his trial was at least as extreme as that in this 
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin. 
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy 
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. Id., 
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first 
trial; there was no second trial in that case. 
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates 
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement 
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from 
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will 
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors. 
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that 
the question whether jurors have opinions that disqualify 
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at 
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption 
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28 
U.S. C. §2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied 
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin 
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a ques-
tion we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analy-
sis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which 
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That 
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is 
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could 
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the 
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality 
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain,-- U.S.--, 
-- (1983) (state court determination that juror's delibera-
tions were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding 
of fact). 12 
12 There are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in 
deciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a 
juror is impartial only if he can Jay aside his opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see 
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a detennination 
to which habeas courts owe special deference, see Rushen, supra, at-. 
Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis 
as to whether a guilty plea was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a 
question involving both a legal standard and findings of fact; the latter may 
be set aside only for manifest error). 
The dissent misreads the Court's opinion in United States v. Reynolds. 
Post, at 11-13, and nn. 6 and 7. Reynolds was decided some 87 years be-
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There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption 
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these ques-
tions. First, the determination has been made only after an 
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to 
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the 
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (CCD Va. 1807) (Mar-
. shall, C. J. ), usually identifies bias. 13 Second, the deter-
fore the presumption of correctness for factual findings was added to 28 
U. S. C. § 2254. The Court clearly did not attach the same significance to 
the phrase "a question of mixed law and fact" that we do today under mod-
ern habeas law. It recognized that juror-disqualification questions may 
raise both a question of law-whether the correct standard was applied-
and a question of fact. Whether an opinion expressed by a juror was such 
as to meet the legal standard for disqualification was viewed as a question 
of fact as to which deference was due to the trial court's determination. 
This is apparent from the language quoted by the dissent, which notes that 
while the question is one of "mixed law and fact," it is "to be tried, as far as 
the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that character, upon the 
evidence. The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set 
aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest." 98 U. S., at 156. 
Plainly, factual findings were to be considered separately from the legal 
standard applied, and deference was due to those findings. This is also 
apparent from the following passage: 
"[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative 
of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but 
cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be 
taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a 
question of fact, except in a clear case." 98 U. S., at 156-157 (emphasis 
added). 
Taken together, these passages plainly show that the "character of [a ju-
ror's] opinion" was considered a question of fact. Contrary to the sugges-
tion of the dissent, ante, at 11, n. 6, the factual question was not limited to 
whether the juror was telling the truth, but included discovering the "real 
character" of any opinion held. Deference was due to the trial court's con-
clusions on that question. 
13 Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609, 
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective 
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and 
thoroughgoing manner"); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865 
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mination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore 
largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous oc-
casions, the trial court's resolution of such questions is enti-
tled, even on direct appeal, to "special deference." E. g., 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc.,-- U. S. 
--, -- (1984). The respect paid such findings in a habeas 
proceeding certainly should be no less. See Marshall v. 
Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 434-435 (1983). 14 
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the 
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here 
would be impartial. See 28 U.S. C. §2254(d)(8). The testi-
mony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and 
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire 
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case. 
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may 
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions 
and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed, 
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors rep-
resent a cross-section of the community, and their education 
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, pro-
spective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to tak-
ing the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to 
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every 
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that 
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve 
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F . 2d 
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied , 425 U. S. 
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982) 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state proce-
dures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 
(1963) (same). 
"Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credi-
bility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying. 
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express 
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a 
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions 
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible. 
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impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe 
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that 
appeared to have been least influenced by leading. 
The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scru-
tinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as 
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury 
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial 
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in 
his testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the 
challenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission 
to resume cross-examination. In response to a question 
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the 
jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the ju-
ror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it 
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very 
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things 
you have to do every day." App. 89a. After this categori-
cal answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for 
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we 
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testi-
mony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside 
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which 
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need 
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a, 
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the 
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered 
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the 
federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold 
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell 
which of these answers was said with the greatest compre-
hension and certainty. 
IV 
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of 
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion" 
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that 
was empaneled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambi-
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guity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were chal-
lenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption 
of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We there-
fore reverse. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
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